Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2-1-2022

Corporate Governance Reform and the Sustainability Imperative
Christopher Bruner

University of Georgia School of Law
Research Paper Series
Paper No. 2021-22

CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER

Corporate Governance Reform and the Sustainability
Imperative
A B ST R ACT. Recent years have witnessed a significant upsurge of interest in alternatives to
shareholder-centric corporate governance, driven by a growing sustainability imperative - widespread recognition that business as usual, despite the short-term returns generated, could undermine social and economic stability and even threaten our long-term survival if we fail to grapple
with associated costs. We remain poorly positioned to assess corporate governance reform options,
however, because prevailing theoretical lenses effectively cabin the terms of the debate in ways that
obscure many of the most consequential possibilities. According to prevailing frameworks, our
options essentially amount to board-versus-shareholder power, and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose. This narrow perspective obscures more fundamental corporate dynamics and potential reforms that might alter the incentives giving rise to corporate excesses in the first place.
This Feature argues that promoting sustainable corporate governance will require reforming
fundamental features of the corporation that incentivize excessive risk-taking and externalization
of costs, and presents an alternative approach more conducive to meaningful reform. The Feature
first reviews prevailing conceptions of the corporation and corporate law to analyze how they collectively frame corporate governance debates. It then presents a more capacious and flexible framework for understanding the corporate form and evaluating how corporate governance might be
reformed, analyzing the features of the corporate form that strongly incentivize risk-taking and
externalization of costs, discussing the concept of sustainability and its implications for corporate
governance, and assessing how the corporate form and corporate law might be re-envisioned to
produce better results.
The remainder of the Feature uses this framework to evaluate the proposals garnering the
most attention today, and to direct attention toward the broader landscape of reforms that become
visible through this wider conceptual lens. Recent reform initiatives typically rely heavily on disclosure, which may be an essential predicate to meaningful reform, yet too often is treated as a
substitute for it. The Feature then assesses more ambitious reform initiatives that re-envision the
board of directors, and rethink underlying incentive structures -including by imposing liability
on shareholders themselves, in limited and targeted ways, to curb socially harmful risk-taking
while preserving socially valuable efficiencies of the corporate form. The Feature concludes that
until we scrutinize the fundamental attributes of the corporate form and the decision-making incentives they produce by reference to long-term sustainability, effective responses to the interconnected environmental, social, and economic crises we face today will continue to elude us.

1217

A U T H O R. Stembler Family Distinguished Professor in Business Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, thanks to Afra Afsharipour, Martin Gelter,
Virginia Harper Ho, Andrew Johnston, Marc Moore, Beate Sjafjell, D. Daniel Sokol, and the editors of the Yale Law Journal,particularly Joseph Simmons. Thanks also to Sydney Hamer, Amanda
Milner, Sean O'Donovan, and Jacob Weber for helpful research assistance.

1218

FEATURE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

1220

1.

CORPORATE THEORY AND THE LANGUAGE OF REFORM

1229

A. Prevailing Theories of Corporate Law

1229

1.
2.
3.
4.

Shareholder Primacy: Shareholder Power and Shareholder Purpose
Nexus of Contracts: Board Power and Shareholder Purpose
Team Production: Board Power and Stakeholder Purpose
The Incompleteness of Prevailing Theories

B. Broader Possibilities
II. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AND THE CORPORATE FORM

A. Excessive Risk-Taking and Cost Externalization

1229
1231
1233
1234
1237
1241

1241

B. Conceptualizing Sustainability

1247

C. Re-envisioning the Corporate Form and Corporate Law

1250

III. TOWARD SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Disclosure-Based Strategies
B. Restructuring the Board
1. Diversity in the Boardroom
2. Workers and Corporate Governance

1253

1253
1259
1259
1262

C. Liability and Risk Incentives

1266

1. Financial Firms
2. Real-Economy Firms

1267
1270

CONCLUSION

1275

1219

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

131:1217

2022

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have witnessed a significant upsurge of interest in alternatives
to shareholder-centric corporate governance. In 2019, the Business Roundtable,
an association of CEOs at prominent U.S. companies, issued a new "Statement
on the Purpose of a Corporation," to which 181 members signed on.1 The docu-

ment expressed "a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders," including customers, employees, suppliers, "the communities in which we work,"
and- presumably not least, but last on the list-"shareholders, who provide the
capital that allows companies to invest, grow and innovate." 2 Emphasizing that
"[e]ach of our stakeholders is essential," the signatories "commit to deliver value
to all of them."3 While this rejection of an exclusive focus on shareholders was
not uniformly welcomed across the investment community4 and has prompted
considerable academic debate,5 signatories included leaders of some of the largest asset managers in the world-notably, BlackRock's Larry Fink and Vanguard's Tim Bucldey,6 whose firms manage $9 trillion and $7 trillion in assets,
respectively.7 Fink has been particularly outspoken on the topic, concluding in

Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation,Bus. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://s3.ama-

1.

zonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationJuly2o21.pdf
perma.cc/9HPD-7B69] (signatures updated through July 2021).
2.

Id. at 1.

3.

Id.

[https://

See, e.g., Council of InstitutionalInvestors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate

4.

Purpose, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/aug19_brtre-

sponse [https://perma.cc/A8AT-3KH5] (expressing concern that the statement "undercuts
notions of managerial accountability to shareholders").
5.

Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 91 (2020) (concluding that corporate governance "that encourages and relies on corporate leaders to serve the interests of stakeholders and not only those
of shareholders . .. is an inadequate and substantially counterproductive approach to addressing stakeholder concerns"), with Colin Mayer, Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism-A Misconceived Contradiction:A Comment on "The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance" by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita at abstract (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 522/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617847 [https://perma.cc/V94X-94]
("Purpose and values hold management to account to a degree that enlightened long-term
shareholder value cannot."). For contrasting views on the statement's practical significance,
see sources cited infra note 152.

6.

See Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supranote 1.

7.

See Michael Mackenzie, BlackRock Assets Under Management Surge to Record $9 tn, FIN. TIMES

(Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e4918ob1-21 58-4adf-8 5 d6-oeb47 66f4d5f
[https://perma.cc/R37P-BNH4]; FastFactsAbout Vanguard, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/H7YE-6JZA].
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his 2020 letter to CEOs that "a company cannot achieve long-term profits without embracing purpose and considering the needs of a broad range of stakeholders."S

It is tempting to minimize such developments as yet another swing of the
corporate governance pendulum, driven in part by a shift in the broader political
economy. The managerialism and stakeholder-centric perspective of the postwar
decades, for example, had much to do with the political and economic circumstances of the times, including large public companies' status as Cold War champions of capitalism, and the combined capacity for business leaders, a robust labor movement, and the government itself to function as effective coordinating
agents in a period of balanced and growing prosperity.' This approach gave way,
after the rise of the law-and-economics movement in the 1970s, to the strongform shareholder centrism that now prevails.10 However, the shift toward stakeholderism that we witness today may signal a more enduring shift due to the
unique nature of the underlying impetus for reform. Contemporary calls for corporate governance reform are driven by a growing sustainability imperativeincreasingly widespread recognition that business as usual, despite the shortterm value generated, could undermine social and economic stability and perhaps even threaten our long-term survival if we fail to grapple with associated
costs."1

While discourse on sustainability remains as susceptible to charged rhetoric
as any domain of public policy,12 the sustainability imperative has become impossible to dismiss as mere hyperbole due to the range of complex and interconnected environmental, social, and economic crises that we face. The International Panel on Climate Change estimates that we are "more likely than not" to
see global warming of 1. 5 °C above preindustrial levels by 2040, threatening a
range of dire environmental consequences and attendant social and economic

8.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink's 2020 Letter to CEOs:A FundamentalReshapingof Finance, BLAcKROcK
(2020) (emphasis omitted), https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/U9UT-LW3V].

9.

See Harwell Wells, "CorporationLaw is Dead": Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and the
Puzzle of CorporationLaw at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUs. L. 305, 319-47
(2013).

10.

See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 229-31.

11.

See Beate Sjafjell & Christopher M. Bruner, Corporationsand Sustainability,in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 3, 3-11 (Beate

Sjaf jell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019).
12.

See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, In Climate Debate, ExaggerationIs a Pitfall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/o2/25/science/earth/25hype.html [https://perma.cc
/ 5 ZY3-3FRP].
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risks, and concludes that it is now "unequivocal that human influence has
warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land."" An interdisciplinary team of scientists has sought to define Earth's "planetary boundaries," quantifying what the
planet can bear in various respects, and has concluded that several of the identified boundaries have already been exceeded-including climate change and biosphere integrity, which function as "core" boundaries establishing "planetarylevel overarching systems."" Some estimates suggest that it would require 1.7
Earths to sustain the global population's rate of resource use, and that this figure
would balloon to five Earths if everyone consumed resources at the rate the U.S.
population does.15
Meanwhile, although the worldwide rate of extreme poverty has fallen over
recent decades - due principally to the economic rise of China and India 16 - staggering inequalities persist," and the United States has hardly been immune. Income has grown dramatically for the wealthy yet stagnated for most of the U.S.

Richard P. Allan et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL

13.

SCIENCE BASIS 4,14-15 (Valdrie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2021) (emphasis omitted), https:

//www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wgi/downloads/report/IPCCAR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/USLK-94K]; see also Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common
Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2020) (noting that experts expect warming of at least 2.9*C
to 3.4°C, even in the unlikely scenario of full and ongoing commitment to the Paris Agreement).
14.

Will Steffen et al., PlanetaryBoundaries: Guiding Human Development on a ChangingPlanet,
347 SCIENCE 1259855, 1259855-1 to -8 (2015); see also Johan Rockstr6m et al., PlanetaryBoundaries:Exploring the Safe OperatingSpaceforHumanity, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (2009) (estimating
that "humanity has already transgressed three planetary boundaries: for climate change, rate
of biodiversity loss, and changes to the global nitrogen cycle").

15.

See How Many Earths? How Many Countries?, EARTH OVERSHOOT DAY (2021), https://www

.overshootday.org/how-many-earths-or-countries-do-we-need
V6ZY].

[https:

//perma.cc/Z9NA-

16.

See Deborah Hardoon, Sophia Ayele & Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva, An Economy for the 1%: How
Privilege and Power in the Economy Drive Extreme Inequality and How This Can Be Stopped,
OxFAM 8 (Jan. 18, 2016), https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/an-economy-for-the-1
-how-privilege-and-power-in-the-economy-drive-extreme-inequ-592643 [https://perma.cc
/AED3-EUPX] ; see also World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2020, INT'L LAB. ORG. 14
(2020), https://www.io.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_734455.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR73-44SA] ("While labour income inequality at the global level has declined over the past 15 years - as a result of economic
convergence driven by countries such as India and China, which have enjoyed a rise in average
labour income - inequality within countries has stagnated over the same period.").

17.

See Hardoon et al., supra note 16, at 13; U.N. Secretary-General, Progress Towards the Sustain-

able Development Goals,
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population, and "40% of Americans are living so close to the edge that they cannot absorb an unexpected $400 expense." 8 Extraordinary concentrations of
wealth and resulting inequalities impede further poverty reduction and more
generally undermine social stability in developed and developing economies
alike.19 These challenges have only intensified following the onset of the
COVID-1 9 pandemic.2 0
Businesses and capital markets have contributed significantly to these crises.21 Business entities are among the world's most significant economic actors,
growing in number at an extraordinary rate22 and sometimes rivaling even the
largest countries in their economic magnitude and power.23 Their operations
significantly impact all dimensions of sustainability.2 4 The transportation, industrial, and commercial sectors are among the principal emitters of greenhouse

18.

Zeynep Ton, RaisingWages Is the Right Thing to Do, and Doesn'tHave to Be Badfor YourBottom
Line, HARV. Bus. REV. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://hbr.org/2o19/o4/raising-wages-is-good-foremployees-and-doesnt-have-to-be-bad-for-your-bottom-line
[https://perma.cc/9F9G6RNY].

ig.

See Hardoon et al., supra note 16, at 9-10, 18.

20.

See, e.g., Rebecca Robbins & Peter S. Goodman, Pfizer Reaps Hundreds of Millions in Profits
from Covid Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/oS/o4/business/pfizer-covid-vaccine-profits.html [https://perma.cc/5M86-HY7D]; Erin Schumaker,
Vaccination Rates Lag in Communities of Color, But It's Not Only Due to Hesitancy, Experts Say,

ABC NEWS (May 8, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/vaccination-rates-lag-communities-color-due-hesitancy-experts/story?id=77272753 [https://perma.cc/RLY8-7RGP]; James
Temple, The Unholy Alliance of Covid-19, Nationalism, and Climate Change, MIT TECH. REV.
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2o2o/o4/1o/998969/the-unholy-alliance-of-covid-19-nationalism-and-climate-change [https://perma.cc/SV7L-5YRB].
21.

See CHRISTOPHERM. BRUNER, THE CORPORATIONAS TECHNOLOGY: RE-CALIBRATING CORPO-

RATE GOVERNANCE FORA SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2-21) (on
file with author).
22.

See COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO
RESTORE TRUST IN IT 22 (2013) ("[T]he number [of corporations] is growing rapidly-since

1992 the number of firms in the US has increased by about one-third. Elsewhere in the world,
they are mushrooming even faster.").
23.

See Milan Babic, Eelke Heemskerk & Jan Fichtner, Who Is More Powerful - States or Corporations?, CONVERSATION (July 10, 2018, 11:14 AM EDT), https://theconversation.com/who-is-

more-powerful-states-or-corporations-99616 [https://perma.cc/QW5X-RZAM]; Fernando
Belinch6n & Qayyah Moynihan, 25 GiantCompanies thatAre Bigger than Entire Countries,BUS.
INSIDER (July 25, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/25-giant-companies-that-earnmore-than-entire-countries- 2018 -7 [https://perma.cc/EUA2-A5FV].
24.

See generally THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAw, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 11 (providing a comprehensive survey of corporate-sustainability

issues).
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gases, contributing to global warming. 25 Economic inequalities, too, have been
exacerbated in recent decades by the redistribution of corporate gains from labor
to capital. That redistribution has been fueled in the United States by growing
shareholder power and activism, which have increasingly pressured companies
"to cut labor costs, resulting in wage reductions within firms and the 'fissuring'
of the workplace." 26 Although such crises cannot be attributed entirely to big
business, it is nevertheless "hard to imagine any solution to these problems that
does not entail a change in corporate behavior.""
Many scholars have argued that sustainability is best pursued through extracorporate regulation such as environmental and labor laws, leaving corporate
governance itself to focus exclusively on shareholders. 28 But the inadequacies of
this reactive approach are increasingly apparent. As Sarah Light observes, "managers make decisions with profound environmental consequences long before
pollution comes out of a pipe or smokestack as an externality," and greater attention to "fields governing corporate decisionmaking and market architecture
can yield solutions to enduring problems that traditional federal environmental
law has been unable to solve on its own."" Notably, this includes "cumulative

25.

See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa
.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/DJJ9-6J4W]; see
also Paul Griffin, The Carbon MajorsDatabase: CDPCarbon MajorsReport 2017, CDP 2, 5 (July
2017),
https://6fefcbb86e6lafib2fC4-c 7 odead6ced55ob4d98 7 d 7 co3fcddid.ssl.cf3.rackcdn
.com/cms/reports/documents/ooo/oo2/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LTS-EFK4] (reporting that, of the one hundred "largest company-related
sources" of greenhouse gas emissions, fifty-seven are "investor-owned companies"); Lowell
Ungar & Andrew Whitlock, Energy Efficiency and CorporateSustainability: Saving Money While
Meeting Climate Goals, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/eecs-smmcgo.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AHZ
-2KDW] ("Companies directly control roughly three-fourths of all US energy use and consequent emissions.").

26.

Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanationfor the Recent Evolution of theAmerican Economy 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,Working
Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/workingpapers/w27193
/w2 7 193.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7YF-LEXH] ; see also Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common
Ownership and the Decline of the American Worker (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 584/2021, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3832o69 [https://perma.cc/2LWDG8ZF] (arguing that the shift towards "common ownership" of companies by large institutional investors has been a key driver of income inequality).

27.

Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, CorporateLaw and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1474
(2020).

28.

See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE

29.

LAW 35-39 (1991).

Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporationas Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140-41
(2019).
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harms like climate change" that "sit uneasily within the traditional paradigm of
environmental law, which tends to focus on controlling, reducing, or reporting
significant amounts of pollution" but lacks effective tools to promote changes in
harmful day-to-day business practices that produce large-scale aggregate effects
over time. 30

As a practical matter, there is further reason to doubt that extracorporate regulation alone could possibly constrain such politically powerful actors. 3 1 Even
those favoring shareholder-centric corporate governance have conceded that
major corporations' ability to neutralize external regulations may effectively undermine attempts to force businesses to internalize the environmental and social
costs associated with their activities. 32 It is thus critical to assess how decisionmaking incentives take shape in the first place, and how governance reforms
might render corporate decision-making more sustainable.33
Growing awareness of the sustainability imperative has driven the recent
shift away from shareholder-centric corporate governance. The Business
Roundtable statement, for example, cites the importance of "embracing sustainable practices across our businesses."" Fink's letter likewise states that "sustainable investing is the strongest foundation for client portfolios" and that a "company's prospects for growth are inextricable from its ability to operate
sustainably." 35 However, prevailing theoretical lenses on corporate governance
effectively cabin the terms of the debate in ways that obscure many of the most
consequential reform options. In its response to the Business Roundtable state-

30.
31.

32.

Id. at 147-48.
See Christopher M. Bruner & Beate Sjfjell, CorporateLaw, Corporate Governance and the Pursuit of Sustainability, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOvERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 11, at 713, 714.

See, e.g., John Armour, Luca Enriques, Mariana Pargendler & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Beyond the
Anatomy, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 267, 271-72 (3d ed. 2017); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas

Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative CorporateLaw Theory
and Citizens United, ioo CORNELL L. REv. 335, 379-87 (2015) (arguing that corporations' increasing financial influence over the legislative process undermines reliance upon regulation
as a safeguard).
33.

See Bruner & Sjafjell, supra note 31, at 714; Light, supra note 29, at 200-01; Brett McDonnell,
Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel & Anita Foerster, Green Boardrooms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. 335,
408-09 (2021) ; Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-Conceptualizing the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of the
Global FinancialCrisis, 9 J. BUs. & TECH. L. 169, 184-86 (2014).

34.

BUs. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 1.

35.

Fink, supranote 8.
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ment, for example, the Council of Institutional Investors objects that the statement "work[s] to diminish shareholder rights" while "proposing no new mechanisms to create board and management accountability to any other stakeholder
group."36 This exchange reflects the quandary we face when seeking to apply the
familiar terminology and conceptual frameworks of traditional corporate governance discourse to the novel sustainability imperative. Options for reform are
seemingly limited to recalibrating board-versus-shareholder power, and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose.37
Meanwhile, even for those more receptive to a broader conception of corporate purpose, the range of conceivable reforms appears limited to tweaked versions of existing capital-market mechanisms. Fink, for example, narrowly conceptualizes climate change as an "investment risk" and advocates for expanded
corporate disclosures to permit investors to bring this to bear upon their investment decisions, predicting that "companies and countries that do not respond to
stakeholders and address sustainability risks will encounter growing skepticism
from the markets, and in turn, a higher cost of capital." 38 This approach takes
for granted the sufficiency of such mechanisms for redirecting major corporations toward long-term sustainable operations.39 Although renewed scrutiny of
shareholder-centric corporate governance is a welcome development, such initiatives are ill-equipped to promote corporate sustainability because they remain
tethered to a conception of the corporate form that obscures the nature of the
underlying problem. Core features of the corporate form, as presently conceived,

36.

COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., supranote 4.

37.

See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 53-65 (2013); see also infra Part I (surveying

theoretical frameworks).
38.

Fink, supra note 8. On the relation to investment risk, see Condon, supra note 13, at 11-12;
Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Casefor MonitoringNonfinancialRisk,
41 J. CORP. L. 647, 655-58 (2016); and Beate Sjifjell, Reforming EU Company Law to Secure the
Future ofEuropean Business, 18 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 19o, 196-202 (2021).

39.

Cf Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, FiduciaryDutiesfor Activist Shareholders,60 STAN. L. REv.
1255, 1291 (2008) (observing that the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, which posits that
stock prices accurately reflect companies' fundamental economic value, "has fallen into serious
disrepair" as mounting evidence indicates that "stock market prices often depart substantially
from reasonable estimates of fundamental economic value"); Tan, supra note 33, at 200 (observing that "the premises of [the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis] are highly questiona-

ble").
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are simply unsustainable-environmentally, socially, and economically. 4 Promoting sustainable corporate governance will require reforming features of the
corporation that incentivize excessive risk-taking and externalization of costs
onto society.

This Feature interrogates the conceptual binaries that structure the accepted
framework of corporate governance and surfaces more fundamental corporate
dynamics giving rise to corporate excesses in the first place. To set the stage, Part
I canvasses prevailing conceptions of the corporation and corporate law - specifically, shareholder-primacy theory, nexus-of-contracts theory, and team production theory. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of their strengths
and weaknesses, but rather to analyze how they collectively frame corporate governance debates. These theories generally focus exclusively on two conceptual
binaries: board-versus-shareholder power, and shareholder-versus-stakeholder
purpose. Accordingly, reform efforts conditioned by these theories tend to hold
constant the underlying features of the corporate form and associated capitalmarket structures, and so fail to grapple with the fundamental forces that drive
risk-taking and cost externalization.
We should instead focus on fundamental drivers of corporate risk-taking and
externalization of environmental, social, and economic costs, and ask how we
can alter decision makers' incentives so as to steer corporate conduct in a more
sustainable direction. Rather than asking which corporate constituency's existing incentives represent the least-bad proxy for larger social goals, we should
explore how to adjust their incentives to promote sustainable modes of corporate
governance. Accordingly, in Part II, I present a more capacious and flexible
framework for understanding the corporate form and evaluating corporate governance reform proposals. I analyze the features of the corporate form that
strongly incentivize risk-taking and externalization of costs onto society, discuss
the concept of sustainability and its implications for corporate governance, and

4o.

On this tripartite conception of sustainability, see World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future, ¶¶ 1-30, U.N. Doc. A/42/42 7, annex (Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinafterBrundtlandReport], https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZE5-L8RL]. See also David Griggs, Mark Stafford-Smith, Owen
Gaffney, Johan Rockstr6m, Marcus C. Ohman, Priya Shyamsundar, Will Steffen, Gisbert Glaser, Norichika Kanie & Ian Noble, Sustainable Development Goalsfor People and Planet, 495 NATURE 305, 306 (2013) (arguing that this tripartite conception should be viewed "as a nested
concept" in which "[t]he global economy services society, which lies within Earth's life-support system"); Melissa Leach, Kate Raworth & Johan Rockstr6m, Between Social and Planetary
Boundaries: NavigatingPathways in the Safe and Just Spacefor Humanity, in UNITED NATIONS
EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. & INT'L SOC. SCI. COUNCIL, WORLD SOCIAL SCIENCE REPORT
2013: CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTS 84, 85 (2013) (arguing for "inclusive and sustainable

development" between "the inner limits of social boundaries and the outer limits of planetary
boundaries"); discussion infra Section ILB.
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assess how the corporate form and corporate law might be re-envisioned to produce better results.
In Part III, I use this framework to critically evaluate the proposals garnering
the most attention today, and to direct attention toward the broader landscape
of reforms that become visible through this wider conceptual lens. Recent reform initiatives typically employ disclosure-based strategies, which create the
impression of regulatory action, but remain unlikely to substantially improve
matters on their own. Disclosure initiatives do not directly require corporate actors to change anything about how they currently operate; do not alter the incentives of shareholders, the predominant audience, making it unlikely that investor pressures would lead managers to reform corporate decision-making in
any fundamental way; and are often limited by reference to financial materiality,
a narrow concept that is hardly coextensive with society's goals. Although such
initiatives might support more robust reform, they too often substitute for it,
and are unlikely to produce sufficient change on their own.
More ambitious initiatives that take direct aim at board structure -notably,
by improving board diversity, and by involving labor in corporate decision-making-have real potential to promote greater social and economic sustainability.
Environmental sustainability remains another matter, however, as the
Volkswagen emissions scandal illustrates. Although the German automaker has
long had a codetermined board giving labor substantial representation, the company pursued a strategy of relentless growth that encouraged harmful, and thoroughly unsustainable, business practices.4 1 Simply put, employees can have bad
incentives too - a reality suggesting that, as important as reforming board structure may be in advancing social and economic sustainability, it remains an incomplete response to the broader sustainability imperative.
Reforms taking direct aim at underlying incentive structures merit real attention. Notably, proposals for imposing varying degrees of liability on shareholders themselves, in limited and targeted ways, can be fine-tuned to curb socially harmful risk-taking in particular financial and economic contexts, while
preserving socially valuable efficiencies of the corporate form. Likewise, in the
context of global value chains -where widespread human-rights abuses and environmental harms have been committed by subsidiaries and suppliers of consumer-facing companies headquartered in more affluent jurisdictions - reforms

See Matthew T. Bodie, Worker Participation,Sustainabilityand the Puzzle of the Volkswagen Emis-

41.

sions Scandal, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note
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are emerging that could sharpen the incentives of corporate parents and contractual "lead firms" to monitor more effectively, to disclose what they find, and to
take meaningful action to prevent or remediate such harms.4 2
These analyses suggest that there is in fact no single calibration of the corporate form that will promote optimal levels of risk-taking in all financial and
economic contexts. Rather, differing business realities and risk profiles will require more granular assessment by industry, and the optimal liability structures
and risk incentives in various settings likely will not be identical. Most critical at
this stage is that we begin to ask the right questions, with an eye toward the
corporate form's flexible capacities, in order to identify more sustainable governance reforms than those presently garnering substantial attention. Until we
begin to scrutinize the fundamental attributes of the corporate form and the decision-making incentives they produce with reference to long-term sustainability, effective responses to the interconnected crises we face today will continue to
elude us.
I.

CORPORATE THEORY AND THE LANGUAGE OF REFORM

Corporate governance remains hotly contested terrain, and there is a wide
range of views on the optimal governance of large public corporations in particular. These debates have increasingly unfolded, however, within a narrow conceptual range. In this Part, I examine prevailing theories of corporate governance
in U.S. public corporations (Section I.A), and then situate them amidst broader
possibilities (Section I.B).
A. PrevailingTheories of CorporateLaw
This Section briefly canvasses prevailing theoretical frameworks. It aims not
to provide a comprehensive account or a detailed examination of their strengths
and weaknesses, but rather to identify how they collectively condition our thinking about corporate governance and limit our sense of the possible by mutually
constructing a narrow conceptual language of reform.
1.

ShareholderPrimacy: ShareholderPower and ShareholderPurpose

The "shareholder primacy" theory places shareholders at the heart of the corporation in all respects: shareholders own the corporation and hire managers to
run it for them. This view was most famously expressed by Milton Friedman,
who wrote that "a corporate executive is an employe[e] of the owners of the
42.

See infra Section IILC.
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business," with "direct responsibility to his employers," and therefore dutybound "to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally
will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of the society."" For Friedman, this is a straightforward principal-agent relationship, and the "whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to
be selected by the stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal.""
This view prioritizes shareholder interests through majoritarian default
rules. For example, Friedman recognizes that a corporation established "for an
eleemosynary purpose" need not prioritize shareholders in its decision-making,
but he argues that aside from such instances of express deviation from the default approach, "the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation ... and his primary responsibility is to them. 45 Accordingly, boards and
the managers they appoint may not ordinarily prioritize unrelated "'social' purposes" because they lack any legal justification for doing so. 46
At the same time, shareholder-primacy theory locates ultimate corporate
governance power with the shareholders. For Friedman, the shareholder franchise suggests that the board's power is literally delegated to them by shareholders, and the principal-agent characterization suggests that shareholders should
ultimately be in a position to call the shots, even if they ordinarily choose to rely
on managerial judgment.4 7 Subsequent calls for shareholder empowerment are
broadly consistent with this view, arguing that board power is more narrowly
and specifically grounded in election by shareholders, that board decision-making accordingly should focus exclusively on shareholder interests, and that shareholders' governance powers ought to be enhanced in order to constrain managerial discretion along these lines. 48
Overall, shareholder primacy theorists prioritize shareholder interests in
board decision-making and advocate a high degree of direct accountability

43.

Milton Friedman, A FriedmanDoctrine- The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
[https://perma.cc/XTV9Y2CE].

44.

Id.

45-

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§

8.09 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (describing

an agent's duty

of obedience).
48.

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675, 676 -79
(2007).
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through strong shareholder governance powers.4 9 Corporate governance policy
essentially amounts to board-versus-shareholder power and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose, and for shareholder primacy theorists, the favored approach combines shareholder power and shareholder purpose.
2.

Nexus of Contracts:Board Power and ShareholderPurpose

The law-and-economics-inspired "nexus of contracts" theory presents the
corporation as a nexus of private contracts and correlatively corporate law as an
extension of contract law that exists primarily to facilitate raising equity capital.
In what is regarded as "the definitive theoretical account of corporate law from a
neoclassical, contractarian perspective," 5 0 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel advance the mixed normative and positive argument that "corporate law should contain the terms people would [hypothetically] have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm's length for every contingency
sufficiently low," and that the law "almost always conforms to this model." 1
For nexus theorists, no particular group can be said to "own" the corporation, because the corporation itself is simply an abstract legal nexus through
which various corporate stakeholders negotiate the terms on which they will associate with the business.5 2 Corporate law serves primarily to supply the default
rules that stand in the background of any particular deal, and nexus theorists
argue that those defaults should, and typically do, favor shareholders. 53 On this
account, shareholder interests dominate because providers of equity capital, as
residual claimants, would rationally negotiate for a governance system that
aligns decision-making with their interests - both procedurally, through power
to elect the board, and substantively, through directors' duties prioritizing shareholders. 54 Other stakeholders -such as creditors, employees, customers, and
suppliers -have various forms of fixed contractual claims, and so, it is assumed,

49.

See generally id. (proposing reforms for strengthening shareholder power to remove directors); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 5 (rejecting "stakeholderism" as a corporate governance
model); Friedman, supra note 43 (arguing that the sole social responsibility of corporations is
to increase profits, subject to open competition).

50.

KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 4 (2006).

51.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,

52.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv.
6o1, 603-04 (2006).

53.

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 34-39.

54.

See id. at 63-70, 90-93.

supra note 28, at 15.
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would place less value on voting rights and duties keyed to their interests. Accordingly, these nonshareholder constituencies are generally left to seek protections elsewhere, notably by negotiating for them in their contracts with the corporation and by pursuing extracorporate forms of regulation through political
and administrative processes.55 The same effectively goes for those who do not
directly contract with the corporation but are affected by its activities. While
Judge Easterbrook and Fischel largely ignore such effects, going so far as to assume that there are literally no externalities borne by "strangers to the contracts," 6 they assert that even if there were, they could be comprehensively addressed through other forms of regulation.5 7 To be sure, any given corporation
might adopt bespoke charter or bylaw provisions favorable to nonshareholders
or other interests, but such departures from shareholder-centric governance
would violate the implicit deal unless agreed upon up front.58
Despite the centrality of shareholder voting rights and shareholder-focused
fiduciary duties, however, nexus theory departs from shareholder-primacy theory in favoring strong boards. Nexus theorists argue that minority shareholders
in large corporations typically remain rationally apathetic and thereby rely heavily on centralized board decision-making. At most, shareholders discipline management in extreme scenarios, primarily through the market for control that
arises from the potential for hostile takeovers. 59 This combination of board
power with shareholder purpose reaches its zenith in Stephen M. Bainbridge's
"director primacy" theory, essentially a variant of nexus theory building on literature that emphasizes the efficiency benefits of centralized "fiat" in complex organizations. 60 For Bainbridge, the board serves as "a sort of Platonic guardian"
for the shareholders, although its governance legitimacy is more broadly
grounded. 61 The board, on this view, constitutes "a sui generis body serving as
the nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation and whose powers

56.

See id. at 35-39.
See id. at 6-7.

57.

See id. at 35-39.

58.

See id. at 35-37

59.

See id. at 70-72.

6o.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of CorporateGovernance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 552-60 (2003). For additional background, see generally KENNETH J. AR-

55.

ROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); and R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Eco-

NOMICA 386 (1937).
6i.
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flow not from shareholders alone, but from the complete set of contracts constituting the firm." 2
Nexus theory similarly reduces corporate governance policy to board-versusshareholder power and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose, but the favored
approach among nexus theorists combines board power and shareholder purpose.
3.

Team Production:BoardPower and Stakeholder Purpose

The "team production" theory developed by Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A.
Stout63 represents a prominent alternative to the now-dominant nexus-of-contracts theory. 64 But it frames fundamental debates about corporate law in much
the same way, which should not be surprising given that team production theory
is itself another variant of nexus theory. The critical difference is that team production theorists reject the notion that shareholders are the sole residual claimants. For Blair and Stout, the public corporation represents "a nexus of firmspecific investments" by various groups of stakeholders providing a range of essential contributions to corporate production. 65 Accordingly, while resembling
nexus theory in its heavy reliance on board power, team production theory directs that power toward very different ends.66
Blair and Stout argue that the fundamental aim of the corporate form is not
merely to marshal equity capital, but rather to marshal all the various stakeholder
groups contributing to corporate production-shareholders, creditors, employees, and others. They define "team production" as "complex productive activity
that requires multiple parties to make contributions that are to some extent both
team specific and unverifiable to an outside party," resulting in outputs that cannot be apportioned based on relative contributions to the enterprise. 67 On this
view, the corporation is best conceptualized "not as a nexus of implicit and explicit contracts, but as a nexus of firm-specific investments made by many and
varied individuals who give up control over those resources to a decisionmaking

62.

Id. at 560.

63.

See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw,

85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
64.

See David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual?A Critiqueof the Team ProductionModel
of CorporateLaw, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1001-05 (2000).

65.

Blair & Stout, supra note 63, at 275-76.

66. See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 551-52.
67.

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, DirectorAccountability and the MediatingRole of the CorporateBoard, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 418-20 (2001).
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process in hopes of sharing in the benefits that can flow from team production.""
To the extent that the corporate form and corporate law aim to facilitate team
production through the collective contributions of various stakeholders, all of
whom are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, it stands to reason that strongform shareholder centrism of the sort embraced by shareholder primacy and
nexus theorists cannot serve as the organizing principle for corporate law. Excessive shareholder centrism would inhibit the board's capacity to provide credible
assurances to everyone else. Accordingly, team production theorists characterize
the board as a "mediating hierarch," duty-bound not to focus exclusively on
shareholders, but rather to act as a "trustee[] for the corporation itself." 69 Team
production theorists resemble nexus theorists in favoring centralized management through a strong board, but they ground board power in an entirely different rationale-the capacity it gives the board to credibly assure each stakeholder group that it will not be exploited by, or for the benefit of, the others.
Team production theory arrives at a very different conception of the aims of
corporate decision-making, yet corporate governance policy is again reduced to
board-versus-shareholder power, and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose.
For team production theorists, the favored approach combines board power and
stakeholder purpose.
4.

The Incompleteness of PrevailingTheories

The foregoing theories vary considerably in their positive claims and normative preferences. But the fundamental nature of the disagreements among them
can be expressed concisely, because they all focus on two dimensions of corporate
governance, each framed in binary terms. To be sure, these two dimensions alone
provide ample fodder for spirited disagreement. However, it should not surprise
us that efforts to capture the complexities of the corporate form and corporate
law by reference to two binary variables ultimately fail to provide compelling
positive or normative conceptions of the field.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to dilate on these theories' strengths
and weaknesses, which I have explored elsewhere. 7 Briefly, the now-dominant
nexus theory does well with those areas of U.S. corporate law that tend to insulate boards from shareholder interference, such as boards' sweeping statutory

68. Blair & Stout, supra note 63, at 285 (emphasis omitted).
69.

Id. at 280-81 (emphasis omitted).

70.

See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 37, at 53-65; Christopher M. Bruner, The EnduringAmbivalence
of CorporateLaw, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1385, 1395-1408 (2008).
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governance authority" and veto power over fundamental actions.72 But this theory offers no coherent account of shareholder capacity to act unilaterally through
bylaws,73 or domains of managerial discretion, such as corporate charitable donations74 and capacity to deploy powerful takeover defenses,75 that appear to be
grounded in broader values.
Conversely, team production theory does well with structures that deviate
from strict adherence to shareholder interests, yet offers no compelling account
of structures that clearly favor shareholders-notably, board election and approval rights, 76 direct fiduciary duties," and derivative standing. 78 Further, the
"mediating hierarch" conception of the board would seem to require a mandate
to consider all stakeholders, not mere discretion to do so. As David Millon observes in his critique of team production theory, "[t]he very discretion that allows corporate boards to pay attention to nonshareholder as well as shareholder

71.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $ 141(a) (2021).

72.

See, e.g., id.

73.

See, e.g., id. S 1o9(a). On the implications, see generally Christopher M. Bruner, Managing
CorporateFederalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the ShareholderBylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 1 (2011), which explores "the contested nature of bylaws" and "the fundamental issues of
corporate power and purpose that they implicate."

74.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $ 122(9) (2021); see also Kahn v. Sullivan,

S 24 2(b)

(charter amendments); id.

S 251(b)

(mergers); id.

S 271(a)

594

(asset sales).

A.2d 4 8, 61 (Del.

1991) (explaining that section 122(9) of the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes
reasonable charitable gifts); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del.
Ch. 1969) (same); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) (explaining
that the New Jersey statute allows corporate donations "within reasonable limits").
75.

See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., Soo A.2d 1346, 1350-54 (Del. 1985); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,1149-54 (Del. 1989). Delaware nominally legitimates defenses by reference
to "some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc.
v. Newmark, 16 A. 3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Promoting, protecting, or pursuing non-stockholder considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders."). Many other states
do not, expressly providing broad discretion to balance competing interests. See, e.g., IND.
CODE $ 23-1-35-1(d)-(g) (2021). The business-judgment rule effectively accomplishes the
same in Delaware. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the PublicInterest, 8o
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 770-71 (2005); Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciaryand the Meaning of
CorporateLife and CorporateLaw, 68 TEX. L. REv. 865, 914-16 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey,
CorporateLaw as Myth, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 923, 949-50 (2020).

76.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $ 216 (2021) (elections and ordinary matters); id. $ 2 4 2(b)

(charter amendments); id. S 251(c) (mergers); id. S 271(a) (asset sales).
5 A.2d

50 3 , 5 10 (Del. 1939).
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See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
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See, e.g., N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 93o A.2d 92, 99-103
(Del. 2007).
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interests also allows them to pursue shareholder value with relentless disregard
for social costs." 79
Shareholder primacy, meanwhile, faces the same problems that nexus theory
does in explaining deviations from shareholder interests, but encounters additional challenges as well. Notably, it offers no coherent account of structures that
empower boards and insulate them from shareholder interference. Indeed, characterization of the shareholder-board relationship in principal-agent terms is
straightforwardly contradicted by the accepted position in U.S. corporate law
that the board's power, once elected, flows directly from the incorporation statute. 80 As a doctrinal matter, officers are agents of the corporation, not the shareholders, and directors are not agents at all (although they are certainly fiduciaries).81 The shareholder-primacy account may be somewhat more persuasively
applied to the U.K. company, in which the board's power is in fact directly delegated by shareholders (via the articles); shareholders retain extraordinary governance powers unavailable to their U.S. counterparts; and directors are expressly duty-bound by statute to prioritize shareholders, considering other
interests and values only as means to that end-so-called "enlightened shareholder value." 2 Even in the United Kingdom, however, directors are not legally
regarded as agents of the shareholders. 83
As I have argued elsewhere, given the varying strengths and weaknesses of
these prevailing theories, U.S. corporate law appears fundamentally "ambivalent" on the issues of board-versus-shareholder power and shareholder-versusstakeholder purpose. 84 The incompleteness of such frameworks suggests that a
comprehensive account of the corporation and corporate law must embrace a
broader range of dynamics and interests.

79.

Millon, supra note 64, at 1022.

80.

See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918) (describing board powers as "original
and undelegated" in that they are "received from the state in the act of incorporation"); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $ 141(a) (2021) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by ... a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter.").

81.

See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 97-101 ( 5 th ed. 2016).

82.

See BRUNER, supra note 37, at 29-36, 161-66; see also Companies Act 2006, c. 46, $ 172(1)
(Eng.) (charging company directors with acting in "the way ... most likely to promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole," and to consider other priorities only in servicing that end).

83.

See MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION AND THEORY 72-74 (2017).

84.

See Bruner, supra note 70, at 1386 (arguing that corporate law is ambivalent about who holds
governance authority and who benefits from corporate production).

1236

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

REFORM AND THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE

B. BroaderPossibilities
That debates regarding a domain of activity as multifaceted as public-company governance have effectively shrunk to just two binary variables should give
us pause. What might a broader range of possibilities include, and how might
our modes of conceptualizing corporate governance evolve to embrace them?
Remaining with these twin binaries for the moment, it is telling that they
focus on three possibilities but ignore a fourth. As the discussion above suggests,
the shareholder-primacy theory, the nexus of contracts theory, and the team production theory essentially populate three of the four cells of a two-by-two matrix:
BOARD POWER

SHAREHOLDER
POWE R

SH

A RE HOLD ER

Nexus of contracts

Shareholder primacy

PURPOSE
STAKEHOLDER

Team production

PURPOSE

Why does no prevailing theory of corporate governance pair shareholder
power with stakeholder purpose? Presumably, shareholders cannot be expected
to use the governance powers at their disposal to advance anyone's interests but
their own. As Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout observe, "outside the narrow contexts of closely held companies and self-dealing by majority shareholders, many
commentators assume shareholders have no duties at all," remaining "at liberty
to try to influence corporate policy as they see fit-including ...

in ways that

favor their own interests over those of the corporation and other shareholders." 85
This doctrinal reality has prompted particular concerns about activism pursued by hedge funds, given their "short-term focus" relative to other types of
institutional investors such as index funds, pensions, and insurance companies. 86 Indeed, the fundamental divergence of interests prompts Anabtawi and
Stout to advocate that "all shareholders, like all directors and officers, be viewed
as owing latent duties to the firm and their fellow shareholders," which should

85. Anabtawi & Stout, supranote 39, at 1257.
86.

Id. at 1291; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., One FundamentalCorporateGovernance Question We Face:

Can CorporationsBe Managedfor the Long Term Unless Their Powerful ElectoratesAlso Act and
Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. LAw. 1, 3-12 (2010) (arguing that investors with long-term incentives produce better outcomes).
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apply whenever a shareholder "in fact manages to successfully influence the company's actions with regard to a particular issue in which that shareholder has a
material, personal economic interest."87 This proposal amounts to a normative
call to reconceive the exercise of shareholder power to render it more compatible
with stakeholder purpose, at least to a limited extent and in limited circumstances -underscoring the fact that corporate law presently provides no reason
to expect this. The "investor stewardship" movement that followed the global
financial crisis - taking the form of nonbinding codes exhorting institutional investors to engage with corporate management to promote greater orientation
toward the public interest- might be interpreted as a tentative step in this direction." But such initiatives typically provide no account of why shareholders
would be likely to exercise their discretionary powers in this manner, and the
practical results remain underwhelming. 89 These dynamics suggest that we
should not expect much from shareholder-focused reform efforts unless we are
prepared to revisit the legal structures and market dynamics that condition the
incentives of shareholders themselves.90
These observations are reinforced by a comparison with corporate governance models prevailing elsewhere, which plainly cannot be described by reference to the twin binaries that preoccupy U.S. theorists. In Germany, for example,
workers in large companies are granted substantial participation rights, described as "codetermination," in the form of works councils in the workplace and
representation on the supervisory board, which in turn appoints and monitors
the management board in the two-tier German board structure.9 1 The Works
Constitution Act requires works councils at companies with five or more em-

87. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 39, at 1295.
88.

See Tan, supranote 33, at 209-12 (advocating stewardship codes as a more moderate alternative
to Anabtawi and Stout's proposal); Harper Ho, supra note 38, at 699 ("Policy guidelines modeled on the investor codes adopted by the United Kingdom and other governments offer the
most direct approach to address the twin challenges of generally incentivizing active monitoring by institutional investors and improving the accountability of shareholder activists.").

89.

See Dionysia Katelouzou, Shareholder Stewardship: A Case of (Re)Embedding the Institutional
Investors and the Corporation?,in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note

n,

at 581, 594-95 (" [T]he current self-regula-

tory route has only limited potential for promoting strong sustainability."); see also BRUNER,
supra note 37, at 265-67, 272-73 (evaluating the U.K. Stewardship Code's ability to moderate
shareholders' prioritization of short-term performance).
go. See infra Part II; Section IIIC.
91.
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ployees, and gives workers extensive rights to participate in a wide array of decisions affecting "social welfare, personnel and economic matters."" The Codetermination Act further requires that most companies with over 2,000 employees give shareholders and employees equal supervisory board representation, although shareholders elect the tie-breaking chair.93 For smaller companies
with over Soo employees, the employees receive one-third of the supervisory
board seats. 94 In the coal, iron, and steel industries, where German codetermination originated, a special regime applies under which employees receive onehalf representation on the supervisory boards of companies with over 1,ooo employees, and the tie-breaking vote remains neutral. 95 Numerous other jurisdictions similarly give employees some form of governance role, including a majority of the members of the European Union, 96 as well as China, which has adopted
a German-style quasi-two-tier board structure.9" The theoretical frameworks

92.

Id. at 5-6; see also Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution Act], Sept. 25,
2001, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] at 2518, as amended (Ger.) (trans. id. at 17-71) (provid-

ing the full text of the Works Constitution Act).
93.

See Co-determination,supranote 91, at 11 (explaining that shareholders "do have slightly more
say, since the chairperson - who in practice is invariably a shareholder representative - has an
additional casting vote to ensure that a majority is obtained whenever the board has come to
a tied voting decision at the second attempt"); see also Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG]
[Co-determination Act], May 4, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] at 1153, as amended
(Ger.) (trans. id. at 88-102) (providing the full text of the Co-determination Act); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6,1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBLI] at 1089,
$$ 96, 11, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at 2446, art. 9 (Ger.), http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischaktg/englischaktg.html
[https://perma.cc/6GJX5XCV] (full text of the Stock Corporation Act, translated by Samson Obersetzungen GmbH,
Dr. Carmen von Sch6ning, published by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection).

94.

See Co-determination,supra note 91, at 12; see also Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [DrittelbG] [Law
on One-Third Employee Representation in the Supervisory Board], May 18, 2004, last
amended Apr. 24, 2015, arts. 1, 4 (Ger.) (trans. id. at 103-06) (providing the full text of the
Law on One-Third Employee Representation in the Supervisory Board).

95.

See Co-determination,supra note 91, at 12.

96.

See Inst. for Codetermination& Corp. Governance, Why Codetermination?:ACollection of Good
Arguments for Strong Workers' Voice, HANS-BOCKLER-STIFTUNG (Oct. 2019), https://www
.boeclder.de/pdf/mbfpraesargumentsco_determination.pdf
XGS8].

97.

[https://perma.cc/4TW6-

See JINGCHEN ZHAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 97-98

(2014).
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described above cannot accommodate this broader conception of corporate governance, which even defies tidy doctrinal distinctions between corporate and labor law, and between private and public law generally.98
South Africa offers another example of a corporate governance system defying accepted theoretical frameworks and doctrinal categories. South African
company law was historically built upon shareholder-centric English models.99
But reforms have made powerful remedies such as derivative suits available to
various other stakeholders, including employee representatives. 00 They have
also required listed companies (among others) to form a "social and ethics committee" charged with monitoring corporate performance as it affects a wide
range of stakeholders, society in general, and the environment. 1 Although the
extent of this committee's formal governance power remains uncertain, 10 2 influential commentators have advocated a relatively robust role. 10 3 Theoretical
frameworks like those described above cannot accommodate governance innovations like these, which aim to empower stakeholders other than shareholders
and to advance a wide array of private and public interests and values.
Such structures convey by contrast how circumscribed our contemporary
corporate governance debates have become. While the theoretical frameworks
described above vary considerably in their visions of corporate power and purpose, they imagine only a narrow range of potential outcomes because they hold
constant several fundamental dimensions of the corporate form. Students of corporate law, in the United States and increasingly elsewhere, are typically taught
that the corporation has certain fixed, intrinsic, and universal attributes, including legal personality for the business entity, limited liability for shareholders,

98.

See JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN
THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 38-39 (2010) (arguing that the law governing corporate gov-

ernance in general sits at the nexus of securities, corporate, and labor law).
99.

See Tshepo H. Mongalo, The Social and Ethics Committee: Innovating CorporateGovernance in
South Africa, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 11, at 360, 367.
1oo.

101.

102.

See Companies Act 71 of 2008 S 165(2) (S. Mr.); see also id. SS 20(4), 218(2) (providing legal
remedies to a broad range of corporate stakeholders).
See id. S 72(4); Companies Regulation, 2011, Reg. 43, GN R.35 1 of GG 34239 (26 Apr. 2011)
(S. Afr.) ; JSE Limited Listings Requirements, JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCH. ¶ 3.84(c) (2019),
https ://www.jse.co.za/sites/default/files/media/documents/2o19- o4/JSE%2oListings
%2oRequirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UEF-YXRG].
See Mongalo, supra note 99, at 364-72.

103. See King IV Report on CorporateGovernancefor South Africa 2016, INST. DIRS. S. AFR. 29-30, 57

(2016),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/684B68A7-B768465C-8214-E3Aoo7F15AA/IoDSAKingIVReport_-_WebVersion.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FW4K-WF 7 D].
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free transferability of shares, centralized management through a board of directors, and election of directors by shareholders. 10 4 In this framework, corporate
law exists to provide and manage these specific attributes, its main preoccupation being the shareholder-board relationship. As the German and South African
examples demonstrate, however, the capacities of the corporation and the aims
of corporate law are not so simple or universal as these generalizations suggest.
There are in fact numerous workable approaches to corporate governance that
deviate from this static conception, pursuing very different visions of who
should run corporations and toward what ends.
II. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AND THE CORPORATE

FORM

We need a more capacious framework for understanding corporate governance dynamics, moving beyond the binaries of board-versus-shareholder power
and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose. This Part proposes a means of redirecting the conversation along such lines. First, I analyze features of the corporate form that strongly incentivize risk-taking and externalization of costs
onto society (Section II.A). I then discuss the concept of sustainability as a normative framework for evaluating corporate governance (Section II.B). Finally, I
propose a means of re-envisioning what the corporate form is, and what it could
become (Section II.C), to facilitate discussion of potential reforms (Part III).
A. Excessive Risk-Taking and Cost Externalization
Assessing our options moving forward requires a clear sense of today's core
problems. Fundamental problems associated with prevailing modes of corporate
governance include both financialization and the excessive risk-taking and cost
externalization it promotes.

104. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN,

supra note

81, at 75-77; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE

LAW 2-4 (1986); John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler,
What Is CorporateLaw?, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 1, 1-2, 5-15; see also Christopher
M. Bruner, The Corporation'sIntrinsic Attributes, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 60, 66-70 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds., 2017)

(discussing distinguishing features among various lists of the corporation's intrinsic attributes).
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Financialization refers to the general trend since the 1970s whereby "financial considerations became increasingly central to the workings of the economy. "1 0 5 In the corporate context, financialization has manifested through structures prioritizing shareholder interests and appealing to financial markets. 106
These are complex economic and social phenomena, 10 7 but the normative shift
toward shareholder-wealth maximization mainly reflects the rise of the law-andeconomics movement and the associated framing of corporate governance as a
matter of managing agency costs - an account that, as we have seen, strictly prioritizes equity financing and shareholder interests.108 This perspective has been
reinforced by growing adherence among legal and business academics; 109 by
other forms of regulation requiring major investors to maximize their own re-

105. Gerald F. Davis & Suntae Kim, Financialization of the Economy, 41 ANN. REV.

SOCIO.

203, 205

(2015).

&

io6. See Stefanie Hiss, The Politics of the Financialization of Sustainability, 17 COMPETITION
CHANGE 234, 239 (2013).

107. See Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SoC'Y 283, 283 (2013); Davis & Kim, supra

note 1o5, at 203; Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231 (2008).
io8. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 28 (arguing that corporate law resembles

contractual arrangements that corporate stakeholders might hypothetically negotiate); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (describing a theory of corporate-ownership structure based on theories of agency, property rights, and finance); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1018-21 (2013) (describing the relation
between shareholders and management in terms of agency and the normative implications of
this view).
iog. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of CorporateLaw Professors, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1483, 1485-86 (2002); Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REv. 2563, 2603-05 (2021); Millon, supra note 1o8, at 1042.
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turns, prompting further pressure on corporate managers to maximize distributable profits; 1 0 and by a shift toward securities regulation as a source of corporate governance rules.1 " Financialization can cause the short-term interests of
investment intermediaries to displace the longer-term interests of most beneficial investors, 2 while at the same time distancing those beneficial investors
from any direct confrontation with the corporate conduct that their savings finance.11 3

These dynamics promote excessive risk-taking and cost externalization,
which are most readily understood in balance-sheet terms. Financial accounting
defines equity as whatever is left after liabilities are subtracted from assets," and
shareholders accordingly favor actions that increase assets or decrease liabilities.
Such actions benefit other stakeholders to the extent they involve mutually
value-enhancing transactions,115 but these ends might be pursued in less benign
ways-for example, through fraud, excessive risk-taking, and indiscriminate
cost cutting. 116

Corporate financial statements simply do not reflect costs borne by workers
and communities, environmental harms, human-rights violations in global

110. 29 C.F.R.

§ 2550.4o4a-1(c),

(e)(2)(ii), (f)( 3 ) (2022); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Center-

Left Politicsand CorporateGovernance: What Is the "Progressive"Agenda?, 2018 BYUL. REV. 267,

303-14 (2018) (describing the impact of pension-fund managers' duties under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and associated regulations). Whether the Biden
administration will alter this approach remains unclear. See Press Release, U.S. Department
of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Statement Regarding Enforcement of Its Final Rules on
ESG Investments and Proxy Voting by Employee Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021); see also Brian
Croce, DOL ESG Investing Rule Could Be Here to Stay: New Biden AdministrationProposalVastly
Differentfrom One Finalized Under Trump, PENSIONS & INVS. (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.pi-

online.com/washington/new-dol-proposal-esg-investing-could-be-here-stay-experts-say
[https://perma.cc/337Y-ABKQ] (suggesting that a proposed Department of Labor rule recognizing the potential financial materiality of ESG factors could make it easier for ERISA fund
managers to consider them, but noting that long-standing "regulatory 'pingpong"' on the
subject could limit their confidence in doing so).
iii.

See Bruner, supra note 11o, at 284-93, 314-26; Lund & Pollman, supra note 109, at 14-27 (discussing also the impacts of various capital-market actors, including institutional investors,
investor and industry associations, proxy advisors, exchanges, indices, and rating agencies).

112.

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared
Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP.
L. 1, 10, 15-18 (2007).

113.

See Bruner, supra note 70, at 1433-34

114.

See ALLEN

115.

See Armour et al., supra note 104, at 23.

& KRAAKMAN, supra note

81, at 105-09.

1i6. See LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 67-69, 87-89 (2012).
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value chains, and so on." 7 Such externalized costs are very difficult to quantify,
but existing estimates put them at a substantial percentage of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP)."'8 This amounts to a public subsidy of businesses to the extent that society bears costs of production, which distorts markets because those
costs are not brought to bear upon prices."1 9 Although efforts are underway to
devise "impact-weighted" financial statements that more fully reflect such costs,
they remain nascent."2 0
Excessive risk-taking and cost externalization are directly rooted in the prevailing structural approach to the corporate form. Limited liability, in particular,
generally leads shareholders to favor more risk-taking because they capture the
upside without facing the full downside-indeed, promoting the financing of
entrepreneurial risk-taking is understood to be the very purpose of conferring
limited liability.12 1 Structures reducing directors' exposure -including the business-judgment rule, exculpation, indemnification, and directors and officers
(D&O) insurance1 22 - make management more comfortable taking the risks that
shareholders rationally prefer.123 These structures straightforwardly lead to cost

117.

See GREENFIELD, supra note 50, at 129.

118. See, e.g., RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE Do BAD THINGS 171-94 (1996) (estimating the social costs imposed by corporations

at "$2,618 billion in 1994 dollars"); see also Walter H. Corson, Recognizing Hidden Environmental and Social Costs and Reducing Ecological and Societal Damage Through Tax, Price, and
Subsidy Reform, 22 ENVIRONMENTALIST 67, 67-72 (2002) (estimating the environmental, economic, and social costs of "human activities" more generally at $5.1 trillion); Michael Simkovic, Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, 68 DUKE L.J. 275, 304-06 (2018) (arguing
that the magnitude of externalization merits policy intervention).

KORTEN,

THE POST-CORPORATE WORLD: LIFE AFTER CAPITALISM 48 (1999).

119.

See DAVID C.

120.

For a prominent example of such an effort, see generally George Serafeim, T. Robert Zochowski & Jen Downing, Impact-Weighted FinancialAccounts: The Missing Piecefor an Impact
Economy, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2019), https://www.hbs.edu/impact-weighted-accounts/Documents/Impact-Weighted-Accounts-Report-2o19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QRM-28CA] (arguing for the introduction of impact-weighed accounts, which "supplement the statement of
financial health and performance by reflecting a company's positive and negative impacts on
employees, customers, the environment and the broader society").

121.

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liabilityand the Corporation,52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 89, 93-97 (1985).

122.

See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
$$ 102(b)(7), 145 (2020).

123.

See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-53 (Del. Ch. 1996). As the court explains in Gagliardi,shareholder returns "will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted
returns available." Id. at 1052. But corporate directors "will tend to deviate from this rational
acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment,
the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of
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externalization to the extent that harms imposed on others exceed the value of
the company's assets, 124 and this incentivizes undercapitalization (including
through strategic use of subsidiaries), underinvestment in precautions against
third-party harms, and bet-the-farm risk-taking in the face of financial distress. 125 Such problems may loom even larger in contexts where risk-taking is
further encouraged by public guarantees (explicit or implicit), as with financial
firms, some of which are regarded as too big or too central to the financial system
to be allowed to fail. 126 In recognition of these dynamics, corporate law has offered limited protections for creditors, such as distribution constraints and equitable doctrines of veil piercing and subordination, but these are widely regarded as weak and unpredictable. 12
The potential for these dynamics to produce socially undesirable forms and
degrees of risk-taking has been vividly illustrated over recent decades - notably,
by the global financial crisis, which revealed how risk-taking to boost short-term
returns for financial-firm shareholders can have devastating long-term consequences. For example, empirical studies following the crisis have associated
higher degrees of shareholder centrism with more risk in the run-up to the crisis
and worse outcomes afterward. Rudiger Fahlenbrach and Rena M. Stulz found
evidence suggesting that "banks led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned
with those of their shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on
equity" following the onset of the crisis. 128 A "plausible explanation," they suggest, is that bank management "focused on the interests of their shareholders in
the build-up to the crisis and took actions that they believed the market would

derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss." Id. (emphasis omitted). Accordingly,
through the business-judgment rule and similarly motivated statutory protections, corporate
law "protects shareholder investment interests against the uneconomic consequences that the
presence of such second-guessing risk would have on director action and shareholder wealth."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
124.

See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiabilityfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1883 (1991).

125.

See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 81, at 103-04, 112-14, 131-41; John Armour, Gerard Hertig
& Hideki Kanda, Transactionswith Creditors,in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 109, 111-16;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 121, at 109-13.

126.

See Christopher M. Bruner, CorporateGovernance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309,
311-16 (2011); see also infra Section IILC (discussing this issue further, including pathways to

reform).
127.

See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 81, at 109-11, 116-39; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
121, at 109-17.

128.

Ridiger Fahlenbrach & Rend M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN.
ECON. 11, 12 (2011).
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welcome," effectively prioritizing short-term returns over long-term consequences.129 Similarly, Andrea Beltratti and Stulz found that "[b]anks with a
shareholder-friendly board performed worse during the crisis," and suggested
that "the most likely explanation is that shareholder-friendly boards positioned
banks in ways that they believed maximized shareholder wealth ... but left them
more exposed to risks that manifested themselves during the crisis and had an
adverse impact." 130 Consistent with this literature, "financial institutions with
stronger and more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and
boards of directors" have been found to be "associated with higher levels of systemic risk."""

Meanwhile, shareholder-centric corporate governance reforms, combined
with growing institutional power, have prompted similar shifts in corporate policy in nonfinancial firms -including increased leverage and risk-taking, and reduced equity buffers following stock buybacks.13 2 As Leo E. Strine, Jr., former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, has observed:
[I] f the [corporate] electorate itself does not have the correct incentives
and does not push an agenda that appropriately focuses on the long term,
the responsiveness of managers to the incentives they face can result in
business strategies that involve excessive risk and, perhaps most worrying, underinvestment in future growth. 3
Additionally, empirical work examining the systemic-risk dynamics of nonfinancial firms has found that such corporate policies can propagate systemic shocks
through the economy.134

129.

130.

Id.; see also Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking, 93 J. FIN.
ECON. 259, 273 (2009) (finding that "banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater
risks").
Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, The Credit CrisisAround the Globe: Why Did Some Banks
Perform Better?, 1o5 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 2 (2012).

131.

Jamshed Iqbal, Sascha Strobl & Sami Vahamaa, CorporateGovernance and the Systemic Risk of
FinancialInstitutions, 82 J. ECON. & Bus. 42, 43 (2015).

132. See Strine, supra note 86, at 14-15.
133.

Id. at 16; see also Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 39, at 1290-92 (describing excessive risks promoted by short-term investors).

134.

See Mardi Dungey, Thomas Flavin, Thomas O'Connor & Michael Wosser, Industrial Firms
and Systemic Risk 15-16 (Maynooth Univ. Dep't of Econ. Fin. & Acct., Working Paper N29820, 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract=3555836 [https://perma.cc/8K49-LKAY] ("[D]ividend
-paying firms are positively related to our measure of contribution to systemic risk. . . . Firms
with a dual-class ownership structure ... appear to be less systemically important."). They
find corporate governance to be less significant in terms of firm vulnerability to systemic
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To be sure, specifying optimal levels of risk-taking requires regard not just
for negative externalities, but positive externalities as well,135 and as discussed
below, it is unlikely that socially desirable levels of risk will be identical across all
industries.136 It is critical to recognize, however, that endeavoring to assess this
through a simplistic netting of negative and positive externalities against one
another will likely prove impractical. For example, how might one coherently net
social and economic positives against environmental negatives-particularly
those threatening our long-term survival?" Taclding such questions will require a more robust normative conception of what the corporate form and corporate law exist to achieve, and how they aim to achieve it.
B.

ConceptualizingSustainability

There is a pressing need to revisit the underlying assumptions about the corporate form embedded in the twin binaries of board-versus-shareholder power
and shareholder-versus-stakeholder purpose. We should begin by revisiting the
fundamental aims of corporate law.
Prioritizing the sustainability of corporate operations provides a coherent
and normatively desirable framework for evaluating prevailing modes of corporate governance and assessing options moving forward. Sustainability, as described in an influential 1987 United Nations report, aims to ensure that humanity "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs"- a challenge involving interrelated environmental, social, and economic dimensions. 138 This basic tripartite conception
continues to frame the pursuit of sustainability today, 3 9 although the sustaina-

shocks, suggesting that bailout-related moral-hazard dynamics are less prominent in the nonfinancial context. See id. at 13-14. But see infra Section III.C (discussing events suggesting otherwise in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic).
135.

See Simkovic, supra note 118, at 327-28.

136.

See infra Section II.C; infra Conclusion.

137.

See Jukka Mih6nen, Comprehensive Approach to Relevant and Reliable Reporting in Europe: A
Dream Impossible?, SUSTAINABILITY 8 (June 30, 2020), https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12
/13/5277/pdf [https://perma.cc/E4QZ-SBHK]; see also Jeremy Andrew Nicholls, Integrating
Financial,Social and EnvironmentalAccounting, 11 SUSTAINABILITYACCT. MGMT. & POL'Y J. 745,

756-57 (2020) (framing issues of substitution and resource allocation in such accounting systems); Serafeim et al., supra note 120, at 11 ("Care must be taken when aggregating impacts
to not obscure material impacts to stakeholders through netting.").
138. Brundtland Report, supra note 40,
139.

¶

27.

See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Developmentpmbl., ¶¶ 54-59 (Sept. 25, 2015).
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bility paradigm has developed considerably since then -including through concerted application in the corporate context, where it contrasts starldy with narrower alternatives.

140

Corporate social responsibility, for example, generally focuses on the "business case" for sustainability, subordinating sustainability concerns to existing
corporate governance structures and priorities-an approach sometimes described as "weak sustainability." 141 To be sure, profit-driven rationales consistent
with the business case are easily identified-notably, risk management and appealing to various constituencies 14 2 - and there is certainly evidence suggesting
that sustainability-oriented policies can redound to a corporation's long-term
benefit. 143 However, empirical results on the financial impacts of sustainable investing remain mixed, 144 and reliance on the weak-sustainability approach leaves
companies with no clear incentives to pursue initiatives that are unlikely to generate profits, or likely to impair them, 145 suggesting that this limited form of
sustainability commitment is unlikely to respond effectively to the fundamental
problems discussed above. As George Serafeim observes, "many companies have
already plucked the low-hanging fruit," and further progress "typically requires
innovation-sometimes at a major scale-in processes, products, and business
models." 146 Companies' willingness to pursue such initiatives "will largely depend on the corporate governance model that prevails."1 4
Strong sustainability, by contrast, reverses the priorities-subordinating
pursuit of financial returns to what can actually be sustained- and accordingly

140. See Sjafjell & Bruner, supra note 11, at 7-11.
141.

See id. at 4, 7.

142.

See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Virtuous Corporation:On Corporate Social Motivation and
Law, 19 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 341, 349-59 (2017); Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 27, at 1410-11.

143.

See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Sustainabilityon OrganizationalProcessesand Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2836 (2014) ; Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Sustainability:A Strategy? 5-6 (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 19-065, 2021), https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%2oFiles/WP19o65rev4-23-21_aefe2c98-5fa6-44c4-bbae-f68e6f283642.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4D46CM 5]; see also George Serafeim, Ctr. for Effective Pub. Mgmt., Turning a Profit While Doing
Good: Aligning Sustainabilitywith CorporatePerformance,BROOKINGS, INST. 8-10 (Dec. 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o6/serafeim.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/AF3B-TZ93] (discussing findings in Eccles et al., supra).

144. See Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for Longer, INT'L MONETARY FUND 85-87 (Oct.

2019), https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/GFSR/2019/October/English/text
.ashx [https://perma.cc/PG3G-CM84].
145.

See Serafeim, supra note 143, at 4-6.

146.

Id. at 15.

147. Id. at 16.
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focuses on bringing corporate governance into conformity with the sustainability imperative.148 This approach is exemplified by the work of economist Kate
Raworth, who advocates that we aim to occupy "an ecologically safe and socially
just space for humanity" between an environmentally defined ceiling and a socially defined floor." 9 Raworth's approach requires adopting different maximands at both macro and micro levels to prioritize a balanced existence within
that safe and just space, rather than maximizing growth-oriented metrics such
as GDP and shareholder wealth.150
Sustainability offers the benefit of a coherent long-term policy benchmark
more directly keyed to broader human interests and more robustly supporting
direct responses to fundamental problems of corporate governance. From this
perspective, corporate sustainability means:
[B] usiness and finance creating value in a manner that is (a) environmen-

tally sustainable, in that it ensures the long-term stability and resilience
of the ecosystems that support human life; (b) socially sustainable, in that
it facilitates the achievement of human rights and other basic social
rights, as well as good governance; and (c) economically sustainable, in
that it satisfies the economic needs necessary for stable and resilient societies.151
Corporate sustainability, understood in such terms, measures corporate governance against a widely desired outcome to which business and investment
leaders have expressed commitment,is2 even if its pursuit through corporate
governance could take a variety of forms.

148. See Sjaf ell & Bruner, supra note 11, at 4, 7-11.
149. KATE RAWORTH, DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS: SEVEN WAYS TO THINK LIKE A 21ST-CENTURY
ECONOMIST 39 (2017).

Id.; see also id. at 37-51, 197-98 (arguing that economic development and business should be
focused on creating a thriving world for humanity); Griggs et al., supra note 40, at 306 (arguing for a redefinition of sustainable development that accounts for planetary boundaries);
Leach et al., supra note 40, at 84-85 (developing a framework for sustainable development
based on inner social boundaries and outer planetary boundaries); cf Light, supra note 29, at
201-12 (advocating an "environmental priority principle"). In economic usage, "maximand"
refers to a "quantity which is to be maximized." Maximand, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY
ONLINE (3d ed. 2001, modified June 2018), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/239609
[https://perma.cc/9NSA-5LAZ].

151.

Sjafjell & Bruner, supra note 11, at 11.

152.

See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supranote 1, at 1; Fink, supranote 8. The practical significance of
the Business Roundtable's 2019 statement is heavily contested. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk
Roberto Tallarita, Opinion, 'Stakeholder' Talk Proves Empty Again, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2021,
6:20
PM
ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-esg-business&

150.
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C. Re-envisioning the CorporateForm and CorporateLaw
In addition to rethinking our normative priorities, meaningfully addressing
problems stemming from excessive risk-taking and cost externalization will require re-envisioning the corporate form. Specifically, in order to take advantage
of the flexible capacities of the corporate form, we need to abandon the notion
that it possesses a set of fixed attributes. This Section considers how fundamental features of the corporate form might be recalibrated to achieve different goals,
and how various forms of recalibration might interact.
This is not to say that recalibrating the corporate form will render other reforms unnecessary. Since structures incentivizing socially undesirable risk-taking emanate from multiple legal fields, external forms of regulation will undoubtedly prove critical to constraining such excesses. For example, bankruptcy
law increases the vulnerability of tort victims by treating them as unsecured creditors 153 and similarly deprioritizes environmental, labor, and other regulatory
debts. 154 This creates incentives to externalize costs that reinforce those emanating from limited liability155 and further incentivizes overinvestment in risky industries. 156 As in the corporate-law context, bankruptcy law prompts policy debates between theorists favoring narrower versus broader maximands, 157
complicated by similar dynamics of regulatory competition,158 and commenta-

tors have observed that problems associated with excessive risk-taking could be

roundtable-diversity-and-inclusion-green-washing-11629313759
[https://perma.cc/PR8KHCLN] (concluding that "signatory CEOs didn't intend to make any significant changes to
how they do business" based on review of "an array of corporate documents"), with Martin
Lipton, More Myths from Lucian Bebchuk, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Aug. 24,

2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2o21/o8/24/more-myths-from-lucian-bebchuk
[https://perma.cc/U2YN-HS9X] (responding that Bebchuck and Tallarita's study focused on
"high-level corporate governance documents and policies where evidence of stakeholder commitment is unlikely to be found"). Regardless, the statement clearly expresses normative commitment to corporate sustainability. Part III, infra, discusses proposals for more concrete reforms along those lines.
153.

See Vincent S.J. Buccola & Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durabilityand Bankruptcy's Tort Problem,
38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 766, 767-68, 774-75 (2021).

154.

See id. at 768 n.9, 789-92; see also Light, supra note 29, at 190-200 (discussing the disincentives
bankruptcy law creates for firms to comply fully with their environmental obligations).

155.

See Buccola & Macey, supranote 153, at 773-83; Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy
as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of FederalLaw, 71 STAN. L. REv. 879, 88289, 904-11 (2019).

156.

See Macey & Salovaara, supra note 155, at 949-50.

157.

See id. at 943-45

158.

See Buccola & Macey, supra note 153, at 814-16.
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addressed either through bankruptcy law or corporate law.159 Meanwhile, antitrust law may inhibit corporate coordination to combat climate change, reflecting prioritization of the narrow maximand of "low prices and market 'efficiencies"' over broader "social benefits" 160 in a manner resembling debates about
corporate purpose. This suggests that corporate responses to climate change and
improved management of climate risks could be promoted through reforms to
antitrust law as well. 161
These examples suggest potential for mutually reinforcing reforms across
multiple fields of law. But there is reason to doubt that extracorporate regulation
alone could address the problems of excessive risk-taking and cost externalization, embedded as they are at the heart of the corporate form. 162 Many corporate
scholars have questioned the prevailing assumption that externalities can be sufficiently addressed through extracorporate mechanisms and called attention to
the general disregard prevailing corporate governance theories show for the possible insufficiency of external regulation. 163 Indeed, "economic effects that were
treated as 'externalities' in twentieth-century theory have turned into defining
social and ecological crises in the twenty-first century." 164 Given these realities,
and the extraordinary influence that major corporations exert upon the political
processes generating the regulations purportedly constraining them, there is
growing recognition that it is no longer tenable to rely on extracorporate regulation alone to constrain risk-taking and cost externalization. 165 There is a pressing need to revisit the underlying assumptions about the corporate form embedded in the twin binaries of board-versus-shareholder power and shareholderversus-stakeholder purpose, with respect to both our overarching aims and the
means by which corporate law might help achieve them.

159.

See id. at 769-70, 778-83; BRUNER, supra note 37, at 193-96.

160.

Paul Balmer, Colludingto Save the World: How AntitrustLaws Discourage Corporationsfrom Taking Action on Climate Change, 47 ECOLOGYL. CURRENTS 219, 230 (2020).

161.

162.

See id. at 223-29; see also Light, supra note 29, at 176-80 (discussing the "conflict between antitrust law's goals of promoting competition and environmental law's goals of promoting conservation").
See Bruner, supra note 110, at 277-81; cf Light, supra note 29, at 140 -41 (advocating looking to
"fields of law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle" for "solutions to enduring
problems that traditional federal environmental law has been unable to solve on its own").

163. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 50, at 14-19; David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate
Law: Foundationsand Law Reform Strategies,in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 1-2, 7-9 (Law-

rence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
164.

RAWORTH, supra note

165.

See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.

149,

at

123.
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Consider again the purportedly fixed attributes of the corporate form: legal
personality for the business entity, limited liability for shareholders, free transferability of shares, centralized management through a board of directors, and
election of directors by shareholders. 166 It is a point of emphasis in the law-andeconomics literature that these attributes interact in consequential ways. Judge
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, present a rationale for limited liability in
public corporations that emphasizes how this policy interacts with other corporate features and affects corporate governance. 167 Limited liability, they argue,
promotes a "division of labor" between capital providers and professional managers, reducing the costs of such an arrangement principally by promoting diversification and obviating the need to engage in various forms of monitoring. 168
Specifically, limited liability reduces the need to monitor managers because
shareholders have less at risk; reduces the need to monitor other shareholders
because, unlike in a joint-and-several liability regime, their wealth has no bearing on a given shareholder's exposure; promotes share transferability and a market for control because a single share price focusing on the quality of the business
and its management can emerge; reduces research costs to the extent investors
believe that share prices efficiently impound such information; promotes diversification because, unlike in a joint-and-several liability regime, additional investments reduce idiosyncratic risks; and "facilitates optimal investment decisions," in that shareholders with downside protection (plus diversification
opportunities) will permit managers to undertake greater risks in pursuit of
greater rewards.16 9
The key is to recognize the contingency of this arrangement. If we set aside
Judge Easterbrook and Fischel's assumption that this configuration promotes
socially optimal risk-taking, then their insights actually point toward alternative
approaches that might promote more sustainable operations. Just as reduced
shareholder exposure promotes greater governance centralization, greater focus
on shareholder interests, and more risk-taking-and presumably leads shareholders to prefer reduced board exposure as well 7 0 - so we should expect greater
shareholder exposure to have the opposite effects. To the extent we prefer less
risk-taking and cost externalization, greater shareholder exposure would curb
shareholders' risk appetite, and correlatively leave them less comfortable with
insulating managers from exposure as well. At the same time, greater exposure

166. See supra Section
167.

I.B.

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 121, at 93-103.

168. See id. at 94.
16q. See id. at 94-97.
170.
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associated with equity investment would presumably curb the availability of capital for highly risky business models because shareholders would rationally require a price discount to be induced to absorb that exposure."' This would in
turn force businesses to more fully internalize costs of production, reducing the
potential for risky corporate activities to impose harms exceeding the value of
the company.172
As the foregoing suggests, we have choices to make about how to structure
various aspects of the corporate form in pursuit of our goals -potential recalibrations of the "levers" of corporate governance, as I have described them elsewhere.173 We could pursue more or less governance centralization; impose more
or less liability exposure on shareholders and boards alike, directly impacting
their risk appetites; and promote more or less emphasis on shareholders' interests. We could alter the degree to which shareholders control board composition,
how much capacity they have to promote their own interests through litigation,
and the degree to which directors' duties prioritize shareholders' interests over
other interests and values.
These all represent policy levers that we could recalibrate -individually, or in coordination- to promote more sustainable corporate governance.
III. TOWARD SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In light of the limitations of prevailing theories discussed above, corporate
sustainability presents a useful lens through which to assess extant reform initiatives and also points toward other types of reforms that merit real attention.
Accordingly, the remainder of this Feature uses the approach presented above to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals garnering the most attention today (Section III.A) and to explore a broader range of potential reforms
(Sections III.B and III.C).
A. Disclosure-BasedStrategies
Reform initiatives aimed at promoting corporate sustainability have often
built upon disclosure-based strategies. Such initiatives appear unlikely to substantially move the dial, however, for multiple reasons. They do not directly require corporate actors to change anything about how they operate; they do not
alter the incentives of shareholders, the primary audience for such disclosures,
171.

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note

172.

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 1879-81, 1932-34

173.

See BRUNER, supra note 21 (manuscript at 79-102); Bruner, supra note 104, at 81.

121,

at 97.

174. See BRUNER, supra note 21 (manuscript at 79-102).
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rendering it unlikely that investor pressures will lead managers to reform corporate decision-making in any fundamental way; and they are often limited by reference to financial materiality, a narrow concept hardly coextensive with societal
sustainability.
Disclosure-based regulatory regimes assume that speaking to a given matter
will focus directors' and officers' minds on it, and that targeted stakeholders
armed with relevant information will bring it to bear upon their decisions in a
manner that exerts market-based pressures upon regulated entities. Securities
regulation, for example, mandates extensive disclosures aimed principally at financial investors. 175 In the corporate-sustainability context, many reform initiatives have aimed to require companies to make sustainability-relevant disclosures, assuming that various stakeholders armed with such informationinvestors, customers, employees, and so on-will do the rest. 176 These initiatives
are limited, however, by numerous practical challenges, including inconsistent
disclosure standards, the use of financial materiality as a disclosure criterion, and
the isolation of sustainability reports from companies' core securities disclosures.177 Given the flexibility of current regimes, sustainability reporting tends
toward greenwashing, generalization, and boilerplate, and may paradoxically reinforce the effects of financialization to the extent that they conceptualize disclosure subjects solely by reference to investment risk. 178

175.

See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 1-45

( 4 th ed. 2015). For a discussion of the role disclosure plays in affecting corporate practices, see
Condon, supra note 13, at 40 & n.195, discussing literature suggesting that "socially undesirable corporate practices can be reduced through disclosure alone"; Harper Ho, supra note 38,
at 671, describing how "voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial risks" may ultimately "motivate
boards toward improved risk oversight and risk management"; and Afra Afsharipour, Women
and M&A, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 359, 406 (2022), which notes, "Institutions value what they
measure, and they measure what they value. For M&A deal making, data regarding leadership
has thus far remained unmeasured and undisclosed."
176. See Iris H.-Y. Chiu, DisclosureRegulation and Sustainability: Legislation and Governance Implications, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAw, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 11, at 521; Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosure
in ComparativePerspective: Optimizing Private Orderingin PublicReporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
177.

249, 273-74 (2019).
See Global FinancialStability Report, supra note 144, at 82, 87-89; Harper Ho, supra note 38, at
669-71; Virginia Harper Ho, Non-Financial Reporting & Corporate Governance: Explaining
American Divergence & Its Implicationsfor DisclosureReform, 1o ACCT. ECON. &L. : ACONVIVIUM
1, 5-13 (2020); Harper Ho & Park, supra note 176, at 255, 266-69; McDonnell et al., supra note
33, at 363-71.

178.
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Given these shortcomings, it is unsurprising that public-disclosure regimes
have largely remained weak and ineffective. For example, in 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded on the prior requirement
to disclose basic employment figures to require further that public companies
provide a general description of "human capital resources. "
Such disclosures
remain cabined by reference to financial materiality, and open-ended in that no
particular disclosure standard is required-indeed, the term "human capital" remains undefined. 180 Early evidence "suggests that the quality of disclosure provided by firms has been low so far." 8 1 Meanwhile, disclosures regarding governmental proceedings under environmental laws were simultaneously carved
back by substantially increasing the dollar threshold for required reporting," 2
and it remains unclear whether the SEC will require any significant climate-related disclosures."' Public-disclosure regimes adopted in other jurisdictions
similarly remain modest and highly flexible -sometimes employing a "comply
or explain" structure that permits disclosure in lieu of compliance with a recommended practice - and typically focus on shareholders and their interests.184
Growing discontent with the state of sustainability disclosures is entirely
comprehensible. As Stavros Gadinis and Amelia Miazad observe, such disclosures generally "say nothing about what the company is not acting upon," give
"no insight into what stakeholders' real concerns are," and describe the company's actions "without any basis on which to assess their adequacy."185 To date,
such regimes are thought to have had "limited or, in some cases, no effects at

179.

Modernization of Regulation S-K Items io1, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726, 63,739 (Oct. 8,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 239, 240).

180. See id.
181.

George S. Georgiev, The Human CapitalManagementMovement in U.S. CorporateLaw, 95 TUL.
L. REv. 639, 718 (2021).

182.

See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items io1, 103, and 1o5, 85 Fed. Reg. at 63,742.

183.

See Andrew Ramonas, Andrea Vittorio & Amanda Iacone, SEC Plans Rules on Climate Disclosures, Cyber Risks this Fall, BLOOMBERG L. (June 11, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-proposals-on-climate-esg-disclosures-planned-for-october
[https://perma.cc/TGR5-DZFC]; Andrew Ramonas, SEC 'Mission Creep'on Climate Ups Republican Lawsuit Threats, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2021, 6:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-mission-creep-on-climate-ups-republican-lawsuit-threats
[https://perma.cc/XNC8-CCJU].

184. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Leadersor Laggards?CorporateSustainabilityin Hong Kong and
Singapore, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 11, at 504, 511-12, 514-15; Chiu, supranote 176, at 523-26; Mah6nen,

supra note 137, at 19-30.
185.

Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 27, at 1471.
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all," leading Barnali Choudhury and Martin Petrin to conclude that "governments are more focused on giving the appearance that these types of problems
are being addressed rather than working to eradicate the problem's root
causes." 186

Meaningful public disclosures undoubtedly represent "a necessary step to
incentivize firms to change," 187 but we have been too ready to assume their sufficiency due to questionable assumptions about investors' capacity to pressure
corporate managers to adopt sustainable practices. To be sure, investors have
themselves actively pushed for increased disclosures,188 and have even had some
limited success through more aggressive forms of activism, including shareholder proposals and proxy contests supported by institutional investors189although such efforts themselves often make the case in predominantly financial
terms.190 At the same time, it remains unclear that the largest and most significant institutions would, or could, bring sustainability disclosures fully to bear
upon their investment decisions. Major investment funds certainly possess the
sophistication to do so and may follow an activist investor's lead by voting in
favor of a given initiative.191 Indeed, certain categories of highly diversified funds
that are effectively "universal owners" of the whole market may even be incentivized to engage with companies to reduce sustainability-related systemic risks
in order to maximize returns on their overall investment portfolio.192
Even where portfolio-protective dynamics operate, however, they remain insufficient for two reasons. First, funds' investment portfolios are not coextensive

186. BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 91 (2019) (em-

phasis omitted); see also Chiu, supra note 176, at 526 (noting that disclosure obligations "do
not improve stakeholder or third-parry standing against companies in terms of influence or
enforcement"); Georgiev, supra note 181, at 725 (suggesting that the SEC adopt the complyor-explain approach as "a middle ground between highly-prescriptive line items and the existing . . . disclosure rule").
Global FinancialStabilityReport, supra note 144, at 81; see also infra Section IILC.

187.

i88. See, e.g., Condon, supra note 13, at 19-26; Fink, supra note 8; Harper Ho & Park, supra note

176, at 260 -62; Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-DrivenStakeholderism,U. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/04/15/shareholder-driven
-stakeholderism-hwang-nili [https://perma.cc/64ZQ-HSB9].
189. See, e.g., Hwang & Nih, supra note 188; Saijel Kishan & Joe Carroll, Exxon Activist Victory

Marks Coming ofAgeforESG Investing, BLOOMBERGL. (June 9, 2021, 5:09 PM), https://news
.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/exxon-activist-victory-marks-coming-of-age
-for-esg-investing [https://perma.cc/5JME-JBA6].
190.

See, e.g., Kishan & Carroll, supra note 189.

191.

See Harper Ho, supra note 38, at 653, 678.

192.

See id. at 673. See generally Condon, supra note 13 (describing diversified institutional investors' efforts to mitigate climate harms in their portfolios).

1256

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

REFORM AND THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE

with society, and "the ideal level of externality reduction is less for capital owners
than the general population."" Second, these incentives would not apply
straightforwardly to the growing segment of the investment market pursuing
passive indexing strategies that aim not to beat the market, but simply to match
the market return at the lowest cost possible. Such strategies preclude exit and
undercut any strong-form incentive to pursue costly engagement efforts, which
simply drive up fees and thereby render the fund less competitive.194 BlackRock's
vocal position on climate change appears to have been prompted in part by criticism of BlackRock itself, 195 and the fact remains that they hold substantial fossil-fuel investments, 196 have an extraordinary range of clients with diverse interests,197 and employ a very small stewardship team. 198
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber have persuasively argued that the key to resolving the apparent paradox of sustainability-related engagement by passive index-fund operators is the competition, already underway,
to attract the assets that millennials are expected to inherit over coming decades. 199 There is certainly evidence that such dynamics loom large for index-fund
operators, 2 00 and there is good reason to anticipate that competition for millennial assets could prompt some degree of engagement. But we should not expect
too much. While index-fund operators' actions regarding board diversity have

193.

Condon, supra note 13, at 68.

194. See Christopher M. Bruner, CorporateGovernance Reform in Post-CrisisFinancialFirms: Two

Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARiz. L. REV. 959, 970-74 (2018). For additional background, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of InstitutionalInvestors,
31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 94-104 (2017); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 510-20 (2018); John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1407 passim (2019); and Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV.
587, 624-31 (2018).
195. See Annie Massa, BlackRock Puts Climate at Center of $7 Trillion Strategy, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan.

14, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-14/blackrock-puts
-environmental-sustainability-center-of-strategy [https://perma.cc/8TSB-MC7T].
196.

See Dominic Rushe, 'Readingthe Writing on the Wall': Why Wall Street Is Acting on the Climate
Crisis, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2021, 6:0o AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2021/mar/16/wall-street-climate-crisis-emissions [https://perma.cc/22HE-D4TM].

197.

See Massa, supra note 195 ("[BlackRock's] clients include large sovereign wealth funds, state
pension plans and financial advisers with viewpoints that don't necessarily align on what to
do about climate change and social justice issues.").

198. See Georgiev, supra note 181, at 712-13.
199.

Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, ShareholderValue(s): Index Fund ESGActivism and the New MillennialCorporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1303-12 (2020).

200.

See, e.g., Fink, supranote 8 (predicting growing calls for institutions to address climate change
"as trillions of dollars shift to millennials").
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been relatively aggressive, they have remained reluctant to push as hard on climate change. 201 Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber plausibly attribute this reluctance
to a cost-benefit analysis that could limit major asset managers' appetite for engagement in areas critical to corporate sustainability: asset managers remain dependent on corporate managers, who select the investment funds to be included
in their companies' 4o1(k) platforms,2 02 and "fear of confronting management
may explain index funds' more cautious approach to climate change so far." 203
Although "millennials care about both diversity and climate, the gender composition of a corporate board is a far less sensitive issue for most firms than their
carbon footprint"; accordingly, the big index funds can be expected to "intervene
aggressively when the cost is low and tread lightly when it is not. "204
Although robust disclosures may be an essential complement to more meaningful reforms,20 5 disclosure alone remains an inadequate response to the sustainability imperative. Disclosure does not directly require corporate actors to
change anything about how they currently operate; it does not alter the incentives of shareholders, rendering it unlikely that investor pressures would prompt
managers to fundamentally reform decision-making; and it does not provide any
incentive to account for values and interests that cannot be characterized as financially material. In some cases, the attraction of disclosure as a reform strategy
is precisely that it represents "a regulatory tool of minimum intrusion." 206 Disclosure initiatives too often cultivate "the illusion that something is being
done,"207 while at most nibbling around the edges of the core drivers of risktaking and cost externalization.
A more dynamic perspective on the corporation points toward reform strategies that offer greater potential to improve sustainability by more directly grappling with fundamental dynamics of decision-making. Some reform strategies
focus on who the decision makers are (Section III.B), while others focus on how

201. See Barzuza et al., supra note 199, at 1265-69, 1272-75.
202. See id. at 1259-60, 1308.
203.

Id. at 1305.

204. Id. at 1305-06.
205. See, e.g., Andrew Johnston et al., CorporateGovernancefor Sustainability Statement 2-3 (2020),

https://ssm.com/abstract=3502101 [https://perma.cc/4CEN-4827]; Sjafjell, supra note 38, at
215-16. Section IILC, infra, describes initiatives, including due-diligence laws, that build on
disclosure as a foundation for more extensive reforms.
206.

Chiu, supra note 176, at 521; see also Georgiev, supra note 181, at 702 (describing human-capital-management disclosure requirements as "positively anodyne next to some of the transformational proposals coming from progressive politicians and from prominent corporate governance commentators").

207.

Mah6nen, supra note 137, at 18.
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decision makers' incentives are conditioned by structural features of the corporate form itself (Section III.C).

B. Restructuring the Board
Jurisdictions around the world have developed workable alternative board
structures that could significantly impact corporate sustainability,2 08 and these
alternatives are, to varying degrees, receiving attention in U.S. corporate governance discourse. These include structures aimed at promoting board diversity and
various modes of structural regard for labor interests at the board level. 209 It is
important to recognize, however, that bad decision-making incentives may persist regardless of who the decision makers are, underscoring the need to examine
closely the core features of the corporate form that drive those incentives and to
consider reforms more directly responding to them.
1.

Diversity in the Boardroom

Although calls for greater gender diversity on public company boards date
back at least to the 1940s,2 1 0 contemporary initiatives effectively date to the new

millennium. Norway enacted a board gender quota in 2003, and since then several other countries have followed suit. 21" For example, Norway and France impose forty-percent floors for each gender,212 and Germany imposes a thirty-percent floor for codetermined boards of listed companies. 213 In the United States,
California has adopted a quota that varies depending on the size of the board,
requiring listed companies headquartered in the state to have one self-identified

208.

See supra Section lB.

209. See BRUNER, supra note 21 (manuscript at 157-64).
210. See Sarah C. Haan, Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74 STAN. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 22-29), https://ssrn.com/abstract=374o608 [https://
perma.cc/S79K-826X] (discussing a push for gender diversity on U.S. boards "in the late
1940s, expressly capitalizing on the significant numbers of women shareholders").
211.

See Institutional S'holder Servs., Inc., GenderParityon BoardsAround the World, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/7BAN-95KK].

212.

See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman: Insights into CorporateGovernanceAfter the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REv. 889, 889-90 (2015).

213. See Christoph H. Seibt & Sabrina Kulenkamp, Corporate Governance and Directors'Duties in
Germany: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (June 1, 2020), https://l.next.westlaw.com

/Document/I9fb3f7b51cac11e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html

[https://perma.cc
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female director if there are four or fewer directors on the board, two if there are
five directors, and three if there are six or more directors. 214 Many other jurisdictions have adopted soft-law guidance encouraging greater board-level gender
diversity,2 15 and institutional investors have become increasingly vocal on the issue-notably State Street, the U.S. index-fund operator.2 16 There is evidence
suggesting that quota regimes have been effective, 217 but other factors also appear to be at work. For example, Sweden exhibits a high degree of female board
representation by global standards but has not imposed a quota.2 1
Empirical literature on the performance impacts of board-level gender diversity remain mixed, at least partly due to the methodological difficulty of isolating
particular governance-relevant variables.219 However, evidence suggesting a
positive association between diversity and "financial outperformance" has grown
stronger. 22o Hypotheses to explain this have generally focused on process-oriented dynamics such as mitigating the effects of groupthink, and benefits associated with improved sensitivity to consumer and employee preferences.2 2 1 At
the same time, it is becoming clear that hoped-for downstream effects in the
form of greater executive-level diversity have not been realized, suggesting that
distinctive strategies will be required in that critical decision-making context.2 22

214.

See CAL. CORP. CODE $$ 301.3, 2115.5 (West 2021).

215.

See Institutional S'holder Servs., Inc., supra note 211.

216. See Barzuza et al., supra note 199, at 1266-69.
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218.

See Institutional S'holder Servs., Inc., supra note 211.
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See Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 212, at 902-03.

220.

Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Kevin Dolan, Vivian Hunt & Sara Prince, Diversity Wins: How Inclusion
Matters, McKINSEY & Co. 6 (May 19, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/mckinsey
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See Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 212, at 903-06; Afsharipour, supranote 175, at 44-49.
222. See Jeff Green, Black CEO Ranks Dwindle with Ken Frazier'sExitfrom Merck, BLOOMBEP G L.
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2021, 8:35 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-o2-o4
[https: //perma.cc/H27Q/black-ceo-ranks-dwindle-with-ken-frazier-s-exit-from-merck
YZP 7 ] (reporting "renewed pressure ... to increase workforce diversity," and that positions
involving "division responsibility for profit and loss" represent "the traditional track to be a
big-company CEO"); Institutional S'holder Servs., Inc., supra note 211; Steele, supranote 217;
Afsharipour, supra note 175, at 38-40.
221.
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Although other forms of board diversity have not received the same level of
attention, this is beginning to change. Board-level racial diversity has received
greater attention as the "focus on social justice and racism ... has prompted a
wave of businesses to examine diversity within their ranks more closely.""' Most
dramatically, California has enacted the world's first quota addressing board diversity in terms of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity,2 " applying a
structure broadly resembling the earlier gender quota to the same category of
companies. This quota differs, however, as the brackets are structured in a way
that requires less diverse representation on larger boards, and it lumps together
these differing forms of diversity under the umbrella concept of "underrepresented communities."2 25 As a result, overall compliance could be achieved solely
by reference to one form of diversity falling within that umbrella concept.2 2
Lawsuits have been filed challenging the constitutionality of California's
gender quota, and are expected in response to this more recent quota, but such
challenges are not generally expected from businesses themselves. In fact, businesses appear to have accepted the need to pursue greater board diversity,22 underscoring its broader relevance to social and economic sustainability. Meanwhile, California's initiatives appear to have inspired Nasdaq to propose listing
rules aimed at promoting board diversity along the same lines through a complyor-explain regime, which the SEC ultimately approved.2 2 8

223.

Steele, supra note 217; see also Take the Pledge. It's Time for Action. Let's Close the Gap on Board
Diversity, BOARD CHALLENGE, https://www.theboardchallenge.org [https://perma.cc/Z36H2T 7 N] ("The Board Challenge is a movement to improve the representation of Black directors
in the boardrooms of U.S. public and private companies.").

224.

See Darren Rosenblum, California Pioneers New Quotasfor People of Color & LGBT People,
FORBES (Oct. 5, 2020, 12:34 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenrosenblum
/2020/1o/o5/california-pioneers-new-quotas-for-people-of-color--lgbt-people
[https://
perma.cc/H975-M79M].

225. See CAL. CORP. CODE $$ 301.4, 2115.6 (West 2021).
226.

Cf Rosenblum, supranote 224 (observing that "one risk with including LGBT folks in a quota
principally about race is that firms may declare themselves diversity-compliant with few or no
people of color," but adding that "the paucity of openly LGBT people in corporate middle
management makes this unlikely").

227.

See Cydney Posner, New Report on CaliforniaBoard Gender Diversity Mandate, HARv. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/202o/o3/18/newreport-on-california-board-gender-diversity-mandate
[https://perma.cc/H7NM-DWR5]
("California's businesses appear to have accepted the requirements of the legal mandateperhaps also feeling the pressure from large asset managers .... "); Steele, supra note 217
("Some supporters of the new law mandating diversity have been heartened by the outcome
of California's gender mandate for boards.").

228. See Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, Form 1 9 b- 4 Amendment No.

1 (Feb.

26, 2021), at 9-10, 61-62,

https ://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/RuleBook/Nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2020-081
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Workers and CorporateGovernance

In addition to board diversity, reform initiatives have focused on board composition by reference to types of inputs - notably, shareholders providing equity
capital versus workers providing labor.2 9 The exemplar system providing
board-level representation to the workforce is the German codetermination system described above.2 3 The structural emphasis placed on employee interests
dovetails with other German corporate governance features that deviate from
strict shareholder centrism, including a stakeholder-oriented conception of directors' duties, 231 a more prominent corporate governance role for banks (acting
both as lenders and as proxyholders voting brokerage clients' shares),23 2 and
substantial reliance on institutional bargaining rather than litigation as a means
of resolving disputes.2 33
These characteristics of German corporate governance straightforwardly
curb risk-taking incentives and externalization of costs. Indeed, German companies performed better following the onset of the global financial crisis than their
U.S. and U.K. counterparts did, prompting "renewed appreciation of its consensus-based approach."2 " Employee-appointed directors on German supervisory
boards face the same liability exposure for breach of duty as shareholder-appointed directors, but concerns about lesser capacity to bear such exposure and

Amendment_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8BV-DHQG]; Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-92590 (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2o21/349 25 9 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXK3-JLJC] (approving Nasdaq's proposed rule changes).
229. Cf Henry Hansmann, All Firms Are Cooperatives-and So Are Governments, 2

J. ENTREPRE-

& ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 1, 2 (2014) (describing firms as types of cooperatives
controlled by various "sellers of inputs" or "purchasers of outputs").
NEURIAL

230.

See sources cited supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.

231.

See Andreas Rihmkorf, Stakeholder Value Versus Corporate Sustainability: Company Law and
Corporate Governance in Germany, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, COR-

supra note 11, at 232-36; Andreas Rdhmkorf, Felix
Spindler & Navajyoti Samanta, Evolution of German CorporateGovernance (1995-2014): An EmPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY,

piricalAnalysis, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1042, 1045 (2019).
232.

See CIOFFI, supranote 98, at 46, 71, 155.

233.

See id. at 68-69, 81-84, 174-78, 241-42.

234.

Rihmkorf et al., supra note 231, at 1049-50; see also Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
Codeterminationin Theory and Practice,73 FLA. L. REv. 321, 352-53 (2021) (observing that codetermination facilitates coordination that "avoids painful layoffs and allows companies to retain their core workforces, which, in turn, allowed the economy as a whole to avoid the worst
of the economic slump").
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excessive risk aversion are diminished due to substantially lower levels of litigation in general.2 3 Additionally, there is a limited form of risk calibration between
management and supervisory boards in that D&O insurance policies for the former are required to include a substantial deductible - covered personally or separately insured at personal expense-whereas policies for the latter are not.236
Although empirical literature on codetermination's performance impacts remains mixed, at least partly due to methodological challenges resembling those
in the board-diversity context, 237 the trend has been toward more positive assessments, emphasizing codetermination's resilience in crisis situations, benefits
for various stakeholders, and capacity to "promote a well-functioning democracy
and help prevent social division" more generally.2 3
There is good reason to use such structures to rethink our own approaches,29 particularly given recent work associating growing U.S. inequalities
with increasing shareholder centrism and a decline in worker power." Reformers have attempted to introduce limited forms of codetermination in the United
States; in 2018, for example, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed an "Accountable Capitalism Act" that would have required U.S. businesses with over $1 billion
in gross receipts to obtain a federal charter, identify a public benefit to be pur-

235.

See Willi Joachim, The Liability of Supervisory Board Directorsin Germany, 25 INT'L L. 41, 6061, 67 (1991) (discussing the standard of liability imposed on directors and the low level of
corporate litigation in Germany); Gerhard Wagner, Officers'andDirectors'Liability Under German Law -A Potemkin Village, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 69,77-80,84-89 (2015) (describing impediments to corporate litigation in Germany).

236.

See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I
[BGBL I] at 1089, SS 93, 116, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at 2446, art.
[https://
9 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englischaktg/englischaktg.html
perma.cc/6GJX-5XCV] (full text of the Stock Corporation Act, translated by Samson
Obersetzungen GmbH, Dr. Carmen von Sch6ning, published by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection); see also Wagner, supra note 235, at 80-84, 89-91 (arguing that
the deductible itself should not be insurable).

237.

238.

See Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenm iller, Codetermination:A PoorFitfor U.S. Corporations,3
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 870, 889-900 (2020).
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 234, at 349-57; see also J6rg Heining, Simon Jager & Benjamin
Schoefer, Labour in the Boardroom: The Effects of Codetermination on Firm Performance and
Wages, VOxEU.ORG (Apr. 8, 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/codetermination-firm-performance-and-wages [https://perma.cc/FHD2-D7CX].

239. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 234, at 358; see also GREENFIELD, supra note 5o, at 146-52

("Once we understand ... that corporations are to serve all their stakeholders by equitably
sharing the corporate surplus, it becomes clear that the dominance of shareholders within
corporate management is a mistake .... ").
240.

See, e.g., Stansbury & Summers, supra note 26; Goshen & Levit, supra note 26.
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sued alongside the pursuit of profit, and provide at least forty percent board representation to employees.24 1 However, such proposals have been perfunctorily
dismissed. As Grant M. Hayden and Matthew T. Bodie sum up the U.S. discourse, "the academic debate about the superiority of shareholder primacy versus codetermination has not really been joined."242 They explain that the "strategy of law-and-economics scholars to this point has been primarily to ignore,
belittle, or sequester codetermination as a practice that does not deserve real examination."243 This is unfortunate, given the potential benefits that some form
of structural regard for workers' interests at the board level might offer.
It bears emphasizing that codetermination itself is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. Apart from the varying forms of board-level representation already
adopted by various jurisdictions, applying differing levels of representation to
differing categories of companies,24 there are more modest possibilities worthy
of consideration as well. For example, major companies including HP and Shell
have used "stakeholder councils in advisory capacities and to gain strategic 'on
the ground' insight into their operations," representing a form of "network governance" connecting boards with nonshareholder stakeholders.245 Likewise,
more modest adjustments could be made to the board itself. Leo Strine, for example, advocates giving workers "more voice within the corporate boardroom."246 Although he doubts that codetermination "fits with our economy," he
suggests that boards in large U.S. companies might be required to have "a committee focused on workforce concerns," with a mandate including "fair gainshar-

241.

See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, i 5 th Cong. §§ 4-6 (2018). The opt-in public-benefit
corporation has not achieved its goals; very few companies have adopted this form, yet their
very existence creates a negative implication that standard corporate law is more shareholdercentric than it in fact is. See BRUNER, supra note 37, at 45 n.95; Carol Liao, Social Enterprise
Law: Friend or Foe to CorporateSustainability?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
LAw, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 11, at 655, 666-68; Ann Lipton, Benefit CorporationsGo Public, Bus. L. PROF BLOG (July 18, 2020), https://lawprofessors

.typepad.com/businessjlaw/2o2o/o7/benefit-corporations- go-public.html [https://perma
.cc/LD 5 G-RDR2]. Warren's proposal differs, however, in that companies under the Act's coverage would be federally chartered with codetermined boards, and would be required to identify a public benefit.
242.

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 234, at 348-49.

243.

Id. at 349.

244.

See Inst. for Codetermination & Corp. Governance, supranote 96.

245.

Tan, supranote 33, at 208.

246.

Leo E. Strine, Jr., TowardFairandSustainableCapitalism 5 (Aug. 2020) (Roosevelt Inst. Working
Paper),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/202o/o8/RI_Toward
FairandSustainableCapitalismWorkingPaper_2o2oo8.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3LV-PPFZ].
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ing between workers and investors, training that assures continued employment, and maintaining a safe, inclusive, and tolerant workplace." 24 7 Such an approach would do less than codetermination to address problems associated with
strong-form shareholder centrism. But the nascent trend among U.S. public
companies toward more formalized board-level regard for workers (through
broadened committee mandates) is nevertheless encouraging. 248
Reforms like those described above require a broader conception of the corporation, and recognition that the current structural approach reflects a series of
policy choices rather than anything truly intrinsic to the corporate form. 24 9 Were
the conceptual aperture broadened in this way, reforms along the foregoing lines
could attract meaningful attention and offer real benefits -particularly in terms
of the social and economic dimensions of corporate sustainability. 2 0
At the same time, however, we should not assume that altering the decisionmakers will render corporate activities sustainable in all respects - a lesson amply
conveyed by the Volkswagen emissions scandal. Volkswagen has a particularly
robust form of codetermination that creates "a de facto worker majority" on the
supervisory board due to seats reserved for representatives of the government of
Lower Saxony, who have "tended to side with the employees." 25 1 Yet Volkswagen
nevertheless embedded a "defeat device" within their cars' software to "reduce
emissions to legal levels during emissions testing" and then "release those constraints during normal driving. "212 This underscores that stakeholder-oriented
governance does not inherently promote environmental sustainability. "No multinational companies have governance that is quite as worker-friendly as
Volkswagen," Bodie observes, yet the emissions scandal "demonstrates that high
levels of worker participation in corporate governance do not guarantee good
behavior or sustainable practices." 2 13 Simply put, employee-appointed directors

247. Id. at 9-10.
248.

See Georgiev, supra note 181, at 674-75 (describing trends suggesting that board-level compensation committees are evolving toward an expanded set of responsibilities including various aspects of "human capital management").

249. See supra Part I.
250.

Cf Ruhmkorf, supra note 231, at 237-38 (suggesting that corporations with codetermined supervisory boards have the potential to promote sustainable development, particularly in its
social and economic dimensions).

251.

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 234, at 333.
Bodie, supra note 41, at 246.

252.

253.

Id. at 257-59; cf McDonnell et al., supra note 33, at 403-04 (discussing the potential for an
environmental representative on the board or an environmental advisory council).
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can have bad incentives just like anyone else -particularly when it comes to the
environmental dimension of corporate sustainability." 4
This is not to suggest that codetermination could not provide broader sustainability-related benefits -indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that it
can and does.2"' But Volkswagen's experience provides a vivid cautionary tale
suggesting that codetermination could not realistically achieve corporate sustainability on its own. As important as it may be to rethink board composition,
it remains critical to examine closely the core features of the corporate form that
drive incentives for risk-taking and cost externalization, and to consider potential reforms to recalibrate those incentives toward more sustainable decisionmaking - regardless of who the decision makers may be.
C. Liability and Risk Incentives
Focusing on the fundamental structure of the corporate form reveals an additional set of potential corporate governance reforms. Understanding that accountability to a broader set of stakeholders may prove insufficient to deliver
corporate sustainability, some have called for corporate law to expressly adopt a
broader conception of corporate purpose and associated board duties -whether
by reference to "the public" generally,256 or by reference to the concept of sustainability itself.257 There is much to recommend such proposals, given the problems associated with financialization. 258 It bears emphasizing, however, that this
approach effectively holds constant the core incentives that create such pressures
in the first instance. Accordingly, it remains critical to explore ways to condition
the ex ante incentives of all corporate decision makers -including directors and
shareholders alike - to promote environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable corporate conduct.

254.

255.

See, e.g., Bodie, supra note 41, at 250 (observing that the CEO's "plan to expand globally was
popular with VW workers, as it meant more jobs and higher pay," and that "[i]n exchange
for the generally prosperous times at the company, the workers and their representatives generally gave [the CEO] free reign to run the company").
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 234, at 354-57 (reviewing literature associating codetermination with benefits for other stakeholders and stronger "CSR policies" more generally).

256. See, e.g., CHOUDHURY & PETRIN, supra note 186, at 4-5, 83.
257.

See, e.g., Johnston et al., supra note 205; Sjifjell, supra note 38, at 208-16.

258.

See supra Section ILA.
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FinancialFirms

At the risk of truism, we should take seriously the notion that the best way
to reduce excessive risk-taking and cost externalization would be to curb decision
makers' incentives to take excessive risks and externalize the costs. 259 The point
bears emphasizing precisely because it has been routinely ignored- most vividly
in the wake of the global financial crisis. Despite ample literature suggesting that
the crisis had much to do with excessive risk-taking aimed at boosting returns
for financial firm shareholders, 260 postcrisis reforms in both the United States
(e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act) and the United Kingdom (e.g., the Stewardship
Code) focused on further empowering shareholders.2 "' These reforms were apparently premised on the belief that shareholders could be counted upon to discipline recldess managers, despite the fact that shareholders themselves are the
most risk-preferring corporate constituency.262 This is true particularly in large
financial firms, where the effects of limited liability are reinforced by moral hazard stemming from too-big-to-fail dynamics. 263 As I have argued elsewhere, this
response reflected a crisis-reform narrative that quicldy zeroed in on financialfirm managers as the proximate cause without investigating the ultimate sources
of incentives for excessive risk-taking and cost externalization - a failure reflecting incapacity to conceptualize corporate governance beyond the narrow theoretical binaries described above. 26 4
Proposals to recalibrate liability structures in financial firms to reduce risktaking and cost externalization did not gain substantial traction in the wake of

259. See BRUNER,

supra note

21

(manuscript at 132-55).

260. See, e.g., Ren&e Birgit Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis, 12 INT'L REV. FIN. 7, 32
(2012); Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 130, at 2, 8-16; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 128, at 12,

22-25; Iqbal et al., supra note 131, at 43-44; Laeven & Levine, supra note 129, at 264-69, 273.
261.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
$$ 16 5 (h), 951, 953, 956, 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1429-30, 1899-1900, 1903-04, 1905-06, 1915
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); The UK StewardshipCode 2020, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 15-22 (2020), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattach-

ment/Saae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-CodeDec-19-Final-Corrected
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HJ5-H4UP]. The UK Stewardship Code was initially adopted in
2010. See History of the UK Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, https://www.frc.org
.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code/origins-of-the-uk-stewardship-code
[https://perma.cc
/Z9C4-SsPA].
262. See, e.g., DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 25-27, 70 (2009).
263. See Bruner, supra note 126, at 311-16.
264. See id. at 335; Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of CorporatePurposein Post-CrisisFinancial

Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 557-60 (2013).
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the crisis, but such reforms remain viable and worthy of consideration today as
part of a broader rethinking of corporate governance. Although corporate governance in today's largest bank holding companies essentially mirrors that of
other publicly traded companies, with concomitant risk incentives,26s this was
not always the case. Financial-firm corporate governance historically placed
greater emphasis on limiting risk. As Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller
have explored, multiple liability rules were commonplace across the United
States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and functioned relatively
effectively as a means of disincentivizing risk-taking in commercial banks.2"'
Similarly, as Patricia A. McCoy has explored, diminished business-judgmentrule protection for commercial-bank directors has also constrained risk-taking. 267 Investment banks, for their part, typically operated as general partnerships until the 1970s, which imposed a brake on risk-taking due to the partners'
unlimited personal liability.26s
Postcrisis reform proposals to augment liability exposure in financial firms
have sought to resurrect the historical emphasis on risk reduction, while flexibly
accommodating contemporary financial market realities. Claire Hill and Richard
Painter, for example, suggest imposing personal liability upon the highest-paid
individuals in bankrupt financial firms, either by contract or through compensation in the form of assessable stock, but in either case subject to a generous
personal asset exemption, as a means of fine-tuning risk incentives. 269 Peter
Conti-Brown focuses on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs),
proposing an "elective shareholder liability" regime under which SIFI shareholders could choose between facing pro rata personal liability following a

265. See Bruner, supra note 194, at 963-64.
266.

See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992) (finding empirical evidence that
multiple liability schemes incentivized bank shareholders to decrease the risks their banks
took on); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:A
Look at the New Data, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 933 (1993) (same).

267. See PatriciaA. McCoy, A PoliticalEconomy of theBusinessJudgmentRule in Banking: Implications

for CorporateLaw, 47 CASE W. RsRV. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1996) (noting that stricter businessjudgment case law has reduced some bank risk-taking but finding little empirical evidence of
long-term risk aversion).
268. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond ShareholderInterests: Why Investment
Bankers Should Have (Some) PersonalLiability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177-78 (2010).
269.

Id. at 1189-95.
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bailout or maintaining a larger capital buffer. 270 Alessandro Romano, Luca Enriques, and Jonathan R. Macey similarly focus on SIFIs, but instead propose an
"extended shareholder liability" regime. " Under this regime, shareholder liability following a bailout would be scaled based on the centrality of a given institution within the financial system, such that associated incentives to curb risktaking would track the potential scale of externalities that the firm's failure could
impose on society. Again, however, liability would be pro rata, and shareholders
would have the option to reduce their exposure by maintaining a larger capital
buffer. 2
Such proposals trigger a predictable chorus of "standard objections" to the
effect that incursions on limited liability might impose bankrupting personal liability on shareholders ill-equipped to monitor effectively, impair companies'
ability to raise equity capital, and pose substantial administrative difficulties." 3
It is not my aim here to comprehensively evaluate particular proposals, but there
is good reason to conclude that such generic objections are overblown.
Critically, personal liability exposure is not an on/off switch, and proposals
like these are hardly the all-or-nothing propositions that such objections imply.
Degrees of liability could be precisely calibrated by tethering the resulting exposure to a multiple (or fraction) of the initial investment or through liability caps
or asset exemptions,2 7 4 and derivatives products offering further opportunities
to manage shareholders' exposure could plausibly emerge.275 Such a regime
could likewise apply to a broader or narrower range of entities, further tailoring
application.2 71

L. REV. 409, 428-41 (2012). Although the Dodd-Frank Act created a new resolution mechanism to prevent bailouts, this approach is not considered credible given the potential impact of a major financial institution's
failure. See, e.g., id. at 417-25.

270. Peter Conti-Brown, Elective ShareholderLiability, 64 STAN.

271.

Alessandro Romano, Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Extended ShareholderLiabilityfor
Systemically ImportantFinancialInstitutions, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 993-1003 (2020).

272. See id. at 994-97, 1000-02.
273.

See id. at 1008 (listing some such objections).

274.

See, e.g., Hill & Painter, supra note 268, at 1191 (proposing an asset exemption); Romano et
al., supranote 271, at 995-97 (proposing a multiplier based on risk posed to the financial system).

275.

See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 270, at 438-40; Romano et al., supra note 271, at 1003-05.

276.

See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 270, at 412-13; Hill & Painter, supra note 268, at 1189-92.
For a current example of such a liability regime, see N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAw S 630(a) (McKinney
2016), which applies joint and several liability for unpaid wages to the "ten largest shareholders" in unlisted corporations.
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Regarding potential equity-market impacts, it bears emphasizing that flexibility to fine-tune shareholder liability not only permits calibration of general
risk incentives, but also renders maximum exposure knowable and amenable to
pricing, particularly given beneficial investors' increasing reliance upon sophisticated financial intermediaries. The fact that some degree of shareholder liability would reduce share prices as investors discount for this exposure2 7 7 represents a feature rather than a bug, reflecting internalization of costs that would
otherwise be externalized and accordingly promoting board-level risk management to bolster the stock price.2 7 Accordingly, the degree of any such impacts
on firms' cost of capital could be calibrated through system-level fine-tuning of
liability levels and firm-level fine-tuning of risk management, in addition to
other means of promoting investment.2 79
As to administration, such proposals could work in tandem with other regulatory regimes, as illustrated by those posing a tradeoff between shareholder
liability and capital adequacy.280 Implementation via corporate law naturally
raises the specter of regulatory arbitrage, but this could be managed through
federal implementation of a regulatory regime. 281 At the same time, one must
bear in mind that imperfect compensatory collections are not fatal to such proposals. Again, the principal aim is deterrence, reducing ex ante incentives to take
big risks threatening big externalities in the first place.28 2 While the generic objections above may be germane to a nuanced discussion of the design of recalibrated liability structures, they are not sufficiently weighty to foreclose such reform strategies outright.
2.

Real-Economy Firms

Liability-related reform in the financial context should prompt us to think
harder about risk and externalization dynamics in other settings as well. Alt-

277.

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 121, at 97.

278.

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 1907-09; see also Conti-Brown, supranote 270,
at 436-38 (discussing the likelihood that greater shareholder liability would promote increased
levels of risk management).

279.

See, e.g., Simkovic, supra note 118, at 327-28 (citing potential for "increases in public investment" and tax reductions).

280.

See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supranote 270, at 429-31; Romano et al., supra note 271, at 1000-02.

281. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 270, at 434-35, 461-64; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note

124, at 1922-23; Romano et al., supra note 271, at 1002-03.
282. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 270, at 436-38; Hill & Painter, supra note 268, at 1189; Ro-

mano et al., supra note 271, at 993, 1002.
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hough it is often said that banks are "special" due to their maturity-transformation function - borrowing short-term and lending long-term, creating potential for destabilizing runs, and so requiring a higher level of managerial prudence 283 - moral hazard dynamics like those associated with financial firms arise
in other industries as well. For example, major automakers received bailouts following the financial crisis because the industry exhibits similar systemic dynamics, threatening similarly dire consequences if a large entity were allowed to
fail. 284 More recently, such dynamics have arisen with large public companies in
other systemically significant industries such as airlines, where debt-financed
stock buybacks for the benefit of shareholders have depleted capital buffers.2 "'
These trends presumably reflect firms' confidence that they would not be allowed to fail in the event of an unanticipated cash crunch, such as that following
the onset of the COVID-1 9 pandemic. 286 In light of such dynamics, Oscar
Couwenberg and Stephen J. Lubben have drawn attention to "real economy"
companies that, like financial firms, may be regarded as "too big to fail." 28 7 Shlomit Azgad-Tromer has similarly focused on what she calls SINFIs - "socially important non-financial institutions."28 8 Such companies may be candidates for the
sort of corporate governance reforms described above because their decision-

283.

See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FRBNY
ECON. POL'Y REV. 91, 97-99, 102-03 (2003).

284.

See BRUNER, supra note 37, at 285 (observing that the bailout of U.S. automakers became "a
social and political imperative" due to their role as major providers of social welfare benefits,
notably health care); Tan, supra note 33, at 182-84 (discussing systemic risks emanating from
financial activities of large nonfinancial firms, including automakers).

285.

See Henry Grabar, Why Do the Airlines Need a Bailout?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://slate
.com/business/2o2o/o3/airlines-bailout-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/L3SK-PXPD].

286.

See, e.g., id.; Stefan Redlich, This Time It Is 'Too Many to Fail' Rather than 'Too Big to Fail',
SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 20, 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4333214-this-time-is-toomany-to-fail-rather-too-big-to-fail [https://perma.cc/T4XD-462G]; see also Kathryn Judge,
The Truth About the COVID-19 Bailouts, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/kathrynjudge/2o2o/o4/15/the-covid-9-bailouts
[https://perma.cc/Q8CJ-R4GW]
(arguing that bailouts create moral hazard and that "for large, public companies -precisely
the ones that have been loading up on debt to buy back shares in recent years - the bankruptcy
process works reasonably well").

287.

Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Not a Bank, Not a SIFI; Still Too Big to Fail, 35 EMORY
BANKR. DEVS. J. 53, 54 (2019).

288. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially Important

Non-FinancialInstitutions, 7 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 159,162 (2017). On the systemic risk dynamics
associated with nonfinancial firms, see generally Dungey et al., supra note 134
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making incentives are skewed toward excessive risk in essentially the same manner. 289

Others have asked whether risk-taking incentives should be revisited even
further afield. Some proposals focus on the tort context, advocating increased ex
post liability for (at least some) shareholders as a means of reducing risk-taking
and overinvestment in peculiarly "hazardous" industries, as Henry Hansmann
29
and Reinier Kraakman 2 90 and Nina A. Mendelson"

have proposed. Others

would require that a price be paid ex ante to get the benefit of limited liability, as
Robert

J. Rhee292

and Michael Simkovic 2 93 have proposed.

In general, such proposals to restructure risk incentives through augmented
shareholder liability merit real attention, and represent a far more direct means
of achieving corporate sustainability than the disclosure-based proposals presently dominating the discourse.2 94 Further, if the possibility of fine-tuned application were more widely appreciated, this mode of reform might actually be considered a less dramatic divergence from the status quo than those altering control
structures. 2 9 Liability-related reforms essentially hold control structures constant, seeking to make shareholder-centric governance correlatively less objectionable to the degree that shareholders' own incentives align more closely with
broader public interests. The potential benefits of such reforms would likely
come into focus quicldy, were we to stop treating limited liability like a "sacred
cow" and acknowledge the broader landscape of governance arrangements
achievable through the corporate form. 296
The emerging trend toward greater accountability in global value chains suggests that risk dynamics are receiving some attention as more sustainable modes
of corporate governance take shape.297 Such arrangements, organized through

289. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 288, at 163 (citing "the structural characteristics and distorted

corporate governance of SINFIs"); Grabar, supra note 285 ("The question for Congress ... is
not whether to save the airlines - but how to redraw corporate governance to fix its bad incentives.").
290. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 1896-97.
291. Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-BasedApproach to ShareholderLiabilityfor Corporate Torts, 102

CoLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1205-07 (2002) (focusing on increasing liability for controlling shareholders).
292.

Robert J. Rhee, BondingLimited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1450 -56 (2010).

293. Simkovic, supra note 118, at 281.
294.

See supra Part II, Section IIlA.

295.

See supra Section IIIB.

296.

Cf Conti-Brown, supra note 270, at 456-58 (pointing out "other examples in the law where
profit allocations are revisited").

297. See BRUNER,
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corporate parent-subsidiary relationships or alternatively through contractual
buyer-supplier relationships, 29 aim principally to reduce costs by outsourcing
production to jurisdictions where labor is cheaper and environmental compliance less demanding. 29" They now account for a staggering eighty percent of
global trade,300 and have become extraordinarily complex. Apple, for example,
as of 2015, had "785 suppliers in 31 countries worldwide contributing to the production of the iPhone." 30 1 The opacity of global value chains has raised significant concerns about environmental and social harms arising from operations in
jurisdictions far removed from the consumer-facing companies headquartered
in more affluent jurisdictions. 3 2
While the parent companies and contractual "lead firms" coordinating global
value chains 3 3 disclaim responsibility for activities occurring at distant subsidiaries and suppliers organized as distinct entities,304 legal responses have begun
to impose greater accountability. Case law in some jurisdictions (not including
the United States 305 ) has increasingly recognized circumstances in which the
parent company of a multinational corporate group owes a direct duty of care to

298. See Jaakko Salminen, Sustainability and the Move from Corporate Governance to Governance
Through Contract, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 11, at 57, 59-61.

See Davis & Kim, supra note 105, at 210-13; Charlotte Villiers, Global Supply Chains and Sustainability: The Role of Disclosureand Due Diligence Regulation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF CORPORATE LAw, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 11, at 551, 55254.
300. See Villiers, supra note 299, at 552.
299.

301. Id. at 553.
302. See id. at 552-54

303. See Salminen, supra note 298, at 61.
304. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, HarmonizingMultinationalParentCompany Liabilityfor Foreign

Subsidiary Human Rights Violations, 17 CHI.
note 298, at 62-63.

J.

INT'L L. 403, 406-14 (2016); Salminen, supra

305. See Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936-40 (2021); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme

Court Limits Human Rights Suits Against Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/o6/17/us/supreme-court-human-rights-nestle.html
[https://
perma.cc/X8VW-FJMP] (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe
limits corporate liability for alleged harmful conduct that occurred abroad when this conduct
is insufficiently tied to the corporation's activities in the United States); Greg Stohr, Kimberly
Robinson & Jordan Rubin, Supreme Court Backs Nestle, Cargill on Child-Slavery Suit, BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2021, 7:14 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-o6
-17/supreme-court-backs-nestle-cargill-on-child-slavery-suit
[https:
//perma.cc/LD298YHC] (same).
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those harmed by activities of its foreign subsidiary. 306 Statutory responses are
likewise emerging. While some are purely disclosure-based, 0 7 and appear
largely ineffective for reasons resembling those discussed above, 308 others have
built on disclosure to require real action in the form of due-diligence requirements, and even remediation obligations.
France's recent Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law requires large French companies to create and implement "an effective vigilance plan," including "reasonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification and for the prevention of
severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, serious bodily injury or environmental damage or health risks resulting directly or indirectly from
the operations of the company and of the companies it controls."309 Significantly,
the law reaches subcontractors and suppliers with which the company has "an
established commercial relationship, when such operations derive from this relationship." This requirement for a vigilance plan builds on disclosure but extends well beyond it, as the plan must include "[a] ppropriate action to mitigate
risks or prevent serious violations."310 Moreover, "any person with a legitimate
interest" can petition the government to pursue enforcement, or directly pursue
damages in court. 311 French law defines the concept of an established commercial relationship broadly, and based on employee thresholds for application, the
new law is estimated to reach 100-150 large French companies.3

¶¶ 42-62 (U.K.) (discussing the
circumstances under which a parent company's intervention in a foreign subsidiary's management could give rise to "a common law duty of care" to those affected by the subsidiary's
operations); Curran, supra note 304, at 436-44 (summarizing case law in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Union).

306. See, e.g., Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20,

307. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (UK); California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE $ 1714.43 (West 2019); see also Slave-Free Business Certification Act, S.
4241, i6th Cong. §§ 2-4 (2020) (proposed by Senator Josh Hawley) (requiring reporting on
covered business entities' "use of forced labor").
308. See supraSection IILA; see also Villiers, supranote 299, at 555-57 (describing weaknesses of the

California and U.K. regimes).
309. Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des soci6tPs meres et des entreprises donneuses d'ordre [Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RE-

[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017, art. 1 (trans. Eur.
Coal. for Corp. Just.), https://respect.international/french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-lawenglish-translation [https://perma.cc/LU4Q-NN3Q].
PUBLIQUE FRANAISE

310. Id.
311.

Id. arts. 1-2.

312. French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. COAL. FOR CORP.

JUST., at [3]-[4] (Mar. 24, 2017), http://corporatejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2o21/o4
/french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law-faq-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3U6 -DBWM].
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While legal actions have already been filed under this statute, they remain
pending 313 and the law's effectiveness remains to be seen. Meanwhile, however,
similarly demanding laws are emerging in other jurisdictions." Collectively,
these developments demonstrate an emerging trend toward greater liability exposure for companies supplied by far-flung subsidiaries and contractors around
the world, taking direct aim at risk incentives in the firms coordinating these
value chains in order to promote sustainable corporate conduct.
CONCLUSION

-

To date, none of the liability-based reform strategies discussed above have
gained substantial traction in the United States (and most have gained little traction elsewhere).31 ' As I have suggested above, this has much to do with how
prevailing theories have conditioned our thinking about corporate governance,
and limited our sense of the possible, by mutually constructing a narrow conceptual language of reform. 316
Within the confines of that limited conceptual terrain, the prevailing view is
that "corporate law is fundamentally about the process of corporate decisionmaking," and that potential reform strategies are correlatively "twofold"
"changing the decisionmaker" who holds corporate power or "changing the decision rule" that defines corporate purpose. 317 This formulation expressly holds

313.

See Case Report: Wind Farm in Mexico: French Energy Firm EDFDisregardsIndigenous Rights,

EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTs. (Nov. 2020), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin
/Fallbeschreibungen/CASERESPORTEDF_MEXICO_NOV2o2o.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/S2DV-YBGL]; Total Sued UnderFrance'sNew Duty of VigilanceLaw, ENV'T NEWS SERV. (Oct.

23, 2019), https://ens-newswire.com/total-sued-under-frances-new-duty-of-vigilance-law
[https://perma.cc/DSE2-P4MF].
314. See, e.g., Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid van 7 februari 2017 [Child Labor Due Diligence Act],

arts. 4-9 (Neth.) (trans. Ropes & Gray LLP), https://www.ropesgray.com/-/me[https://perma.cc/72PNdia/Files/alerts/2019/o6/2019o6o5_CSRAlertAppendix.pdf
QCRX] ; Desiree Maier, Dorina Bruns & Tanja Woempner, Current Status Supply Chain Act
(Germany), HOGAN LOVELLS (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.hlregulation.com/2021/o2/19/current-status-supply-chain-act-germany [https://perma.cc/L2KS-95RD]. On the status of
such laws and proposals across Europe, see Map: CorporateAccountability Legislative Progress
in Europe, EUR. COAL. FOR CORP. JUST. (June 14, 2021), https://corporatejustice.org/publications/map-corporate-accountability-legislative-progress-in-europe [https://perma.cc/76M2
-KHYB]; and Sjifjell, supra note 38, at 202-04.
315.

See supra Section IILC. The trend toward due-diligence laws in Europe is the exception.

316. See supra Part 1.

317. D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potentialof CorporateLaw, 57 EMORY L.J. 985, 994
(2008) (responding to Kent Greenfield, Proposition:Saving the World with CorporateLaw?, 57
EMORY L.J. 947 (2008)) ; see also Stephen Bainbridge, Properly Understood, CorporateLaw Can't
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constant certain fundamental "legal characteristics," including limited liability,318 and the result-cabining potential reforms to altering the decision maker
or the decision rule - effectively defines liability-based reforms out of the debate
entirely. Not surprisingly, this in turn tends to deflect attention away from corporate law as a means of responding to sustainability-related problems, 319 because many of the most consequential features of the corporate form are treated
as if they were etched in stone.
When it comes to corporate governance reform, we consistently arrive at narrow answers because we ask narrow questions. Asking different questions can
yield strikingly different answers, revealing a much broader landscape of governance arrangements achievable through the corporate form- and therefore a
broader range of potential reforms than prevailing views on corporate governance can accommodate. As the preceding discussion amply conveys, revisiting
fundamental attributes of the corporate form can help identify far more direct
responses to the interconnected crises we face, and offer greater potential to
achieve corporate sustainability.
I have presented here a more capacious and flexible framework for understanding the corporate form and its capabilities and have analyzed the present
features of the corporate form that strongly incentivize risk-taking and externalization of costs as a means of illuminating what sorts of reforms might produce
better results. 32o It bears emphasizing, however, that the aim should not be to
replace one purportedly universal calibration of the corporate form with another.
If anything, the discussion of liability-related reforms above strongly suggests
that there is no single calibration of the corporate form that will promote optimal
levels of risk-taking in all financial and economic contexts. The differing business realities and risk profiles of financial firms, systemically significant nonfinancial firms, firms involved in inherently hazardous industries, and firms engaged in far-flung global value chains require more granular and context-specific
assessment, and the optimal liability structures and risk incentives in these various settings likely will not be identical.
Much work remains to determine what a truly sustainable calibration of the
corporate form would involve, in these and other contexts. But asking the right
questions, with an eye toward the corporate form's flexible capacities, will be a
precondition to identifying more sustainable modes of corporate governance.
Do SquatAbout Sustainability, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 11, 2021, 5:33 PM), https://

www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2o21/o5/properly-understood-corporate-law-cant-do-squat-about-sustainability-.html [https://perma.cc/RES7-CKX2] (endorsing D. Gordon Smith's framing of corporate governance reform debates).
318. See Smith, supra note 317, at 990.
319. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 317.
320. See supra Part I.
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Corporate governance debates too often default to the rigid binaries of prevailing theories, and reform proposals too often default to disclosure. Ultimately,
we need to focus on a more robust conception of corporate sustainability and to
reckon honestly with the corporate features and decision-making incentives
standing in the way. Until we engage with the fundamental drivers of risk-taking
and cost externalization, real solutions will continue to elude us. Taking seriously
the broader range of possibilities that the corporate form offers, however, reveals
ample means of redirecting corporate governance toward a sustainable path.
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